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THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY’S MISGUIDED QUEST  
TO UNDERMINE THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
 
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)1 affirms that one of the 
statute’s primary purposes is “to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices.”2 When President Obama signed Dodd-
Frank into law, he declared that the statute would create “the 
strongest consumer financial protections in history.”3 
In order to implement and enforce Dodd-Frank’s new 
protections for consumers, Congress created the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (“CFPB") as an “independent bureau” within the 

*Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, 
Washington, DC. I wish to thank the Law School and Dean Paul Schiff 
Berman for a summer research grant that supported my work on this article. 
I am grateful to Dick Pierce and Heidi Schooner for helpful comments on a 
preliminary draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Germaine Leahy, Head 
of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library, and Sarah Trumble, a 
member of our Class of 2013, for excellent research assistance. Unless 
otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through December 
16, 2011.  
On January 4, 2012, after the manuscript for this article was completed, 
President Obama issued a recess appointment to install Richard Cordray as 
the first Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. David 
Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama defies Senate, puts Cordray in 
consumer post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A01. As discussed infra in 
note 13, Republican members of Congress and some analysts have 
challenged the validity of Mr. Cordray’s appointment. Discussion of that 
issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
2 Preamble to Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1376. 
3 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-
dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act [hereinafter 
Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement]. 
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Federal Reserve System (“Fed”).4 President Obama explained that 
CFPB will operate as “a new consumer watchdog with just one job: 
looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders, not investment 
houses—looking out for people as they interact with the financial 
system.”5 Similarly, the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank 
explained that CFPB’s mission is to “help protect consumers from 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts that so often trap them in 
unaffordable financial products.”6  
Thus, Congress gave CFPB “the Herculean task of regulating 
the financial services industry to protect consumers.”7 Congress 
sought to increase CFPB’s “accountability” for that mission by 
delegating to CFPB the combined authority of seven federal agencies 
that were previously responsible for protecting consumers of 
financial services.8  
Congress determined that a single federal authority dedicated 
to protecting consumers of financial services was needed in light of 
“the spectacular failure of the [federal] prudential regulators to 
protect average American homeowners from risky, unaffordable” 
mortgages during the housing boom that led to the current financial 
crisis.9 As stated in the Senate report, federal banking agencies 
“routinely sacrificed consumer protection” while adopting policies 
that promoted the “short-term profitability” of large banks, nonbank 
mortgage lenders and Wall Street securities firms.10 The Senate 

4 Dodd-Frank § 1011(a); see also H.R. REP. NO.111-517, at 874 (2010) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730 (“Title X establishes 
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), which will be an 
independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System.”). 
5 Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement, supra note 3. 
6 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010). 
7 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010).  
8 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010). 
9 Id. at 15; see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730 (“The Bureau will have the 
authority and accountability to ensure that existing consumer protection 
laws and regulations are comprehensive, fair, and vigorously enforced.”). 
10 Senate Report No. 111-176, at 15-16 (2010) (quoting congressional 
testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009). For additional analysis of 
failures by federal bank regulators to protect consumers during the housing 
boom that led to the financial crisis, see, e.g., KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA 
A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 157-205 (2011); SIMON JOHNSON & 
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
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report concluded that “it was the failure by the [federal] prudential 
regulators to give sufficient consideration to consumer protection that 
helped bring the financial system down.”11 
As explained in Part II of this paper, the financial services 
industry and most Republican members of Congress vigorously 
opposed the creation of CFPB. During the debates on Dodd-Frank, 
industry trade groups and Republican legislators argued that CFPB 
was likely to impose burdensome regulations that would reduce the 
availability of credit to consumers. CPFB’s opponents also 
maintained that the consumer protection function should remain with 
federal banking agencies in order to prevent consumer safeguards 
from undermining the safety and soundness of financial institutions. 
Opponents further charged that CFPB would have unprecedented 
freedom to operate without meaningful checks and balances. 
Accordingly, they alleged, CFPB would likely become an all-
powerful bureaucracy that would stifle innovation and flexibility in 
consumer financial services.12  
Republicans failed to stop Congress from authorizing the 
creation of CFPB in Title X of Dodd-Frank. However, following 

FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 120-32, 141-44 (2010) (“The Federal Reserve 
sidestepped its consumer protection responsibilities by claiming it lacked 
jurisdiction. . . . While the Federal Reserve was neglecting to protect 
consumers, other regulatory agencies were neglecting to ensure the 
soundness of the banks they supervised,” id. at 142, 143); Oren Bar-Gill & 
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 81-95 (2008) 
(“The problem is deep and systemic. These agencies are designed with a 
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
This means protecting banks' profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a 
lesser priority,” id. at 90); Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: 
Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 151-69 
(2009) (“The events of the past year have laid bare the shortcomings of our 
current system of financial-institution regulation. These shortcomings have 
played out on two levels: consumer protection and systemic risk,” id. at 
151); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State 
Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. Corp. L. 893, 
897-919 (2011) (“Federal regulatory inaction and federal preemption 
encouraged federally-chartered depository institutions and their affiliates to 
become leading participants in nonprime mortgage lending. Ultimately, the 
regulatory failures of the FRB, the OCC, and the OTS contributed to 
defaults and foreclosures on millions of nonprime loans,” id. at 898). 
11 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010). 
12 Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of 
Consumer Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 100 (2011). 
884 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31 

Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the financial services industry and 
Republican legislators launched a new campaign to weaken CFPB’s 
autonomy and authority. The financial sector gave strong backing to 
Republican candidates in the 2010 congressional elections. That 
support helped Republicans to secure control of the House and 
capture several additional Senate seats.  
Shortly after the new Congress convened in January 2011, 
Republican leaders in the House introduced legislation that would 
transform CFPB’s governance, powers and funding. The House 
Republican bills proposed (i) to create a five-member bipartisan 
commission to govern CFPB in place of a single Director, (ii) to 
grant federal banking agencies an expanded veto power over CFPB’s 
regulations, and (iii) to give Congress complete control over CFPB’s 
budget. At the same time, forty-four Republican Senators declared 
that they would block confirmation of any Director of CFPB until the 
President and Democratic leaders in Congress agreed to make the 
same three changes to CFPB’s operations. Republicans again argued 
that CFPB would be a menacing superagency without meaningful 
oversight unless the stipulated changes were made. By preventing 
confirmation of any Director, Republicans significantly limited 
CFPB’s ability to implement its mandate under Dodd-Frank.13 

13 On January 4, 2012, President Obama invoked his constitutional power of 
recess appointment and appointed Richard Cordray as CFPB’s first 
Director. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama 
Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1; Laura Litvan & 
Kathleen Hunter, Cordray Appointment Signals Obama’s Readiness to 
Campaign Against Congress, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 5, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-05/obama-s-naming-of-cordray-
signals-readiness-for-brawling-election-campaign.html. Republican 
members of Congress and some analysts challenged the validity of Mr. 
Cordray’s appointment. They maintained that the Senate was not in recess 
when President Obama issued the appointment. They pointed to the 
Senate’s scheduling of brief pro forma sessions that were explicitly 
designed to prevent President Obama from making recess appointments. 
The Obama Administration released an opinion of the Justice Department 
declaring that the Senate’s pro forma sessions did not prevent the President 
from determining that (i) the Senate was unavailable to act as a body in 
performing its advise-and-consent function on Presidential appointments 
and was therefore in recess and (ii) in those circumstances the President 
could exercise his constitutional authority to make recess appointments. 
Cheryl Bolen, Appointments and Nominations: Justice Department Releases 
Opinion Finding Recess Appointments Lawful, 98 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 
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Contrary to the claims advanced by CFPB’s opponents, Part 
III of this paper shows that CFPB’s governance, powers and funding 
are similar to those of other federal financial regulators. CFPB’s 
single-Director model of leadership is similar to the governance 
structure for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). CFPB’s 
regulatory and enforcement powers are comparable to those 
exercised by OCC, FHFA, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”). 
CFPB’s ability to fund its operations without relying on 
congressional appropriations is, again, comparable to OCC, FHFA, 
FDIC and FRB. The financial services industry and its legislative 
allies have strenuously defended the governance structure, authority 
and independence of OCC and FHFA. Accordingly, it appears that 
CFPB’s opponents are motivated by their opposition to CFPB’s 
consumer protection mission rather than the bureau’s structure.  
As explained in Part IV, the three changes in CFPB’s 
structure demanded by Republicans would significantly undermine 
CFPB’s autonomy and its ability to fulfill its statutory mandate. 
Replacing CFPB’s Director with a multimember commission would 
increase the likelihood of infighting and deadlock within CFPB’s 
leadership. Allowing federal financial regulators to veto CFPB’s 
regulations by majority vote on general “safety and soundness” 
grounds would make it very difficult for CFPB to adopt rules that 
might reduce the short-term profitability of financial institutions. 
Requiring CFPB to depend on congressional appropriations for its 
budget would greatly increase the risk that CFPB would be captured 
or neutralized by the financial services industry. Financial 
institutions and their trade associations have used the appropriations 
process to slash the budgets of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), thereby impairing the ability of both agencies 
to fulfill their statutory agendas prescribed by Dodd-Frank. In 
combination, the three changes advocated by Republicans would 
seriously weaken CFPB’s ability to protect consumers. Contrary to 
the claims of the financial services industry, any weakening of CFPB 

95 (Jan. 17, 2012); Cheryl Bolen, Appointments and Nominations: White 
House Asserts Legal Rationale for Presidential Recess Appointments, 98 
BNA’S BANKING REPORT 99 (Jan. 17, 2012). Analysis of the validity of Mr. 
Cordray’s recess appointment as CFPB Director is beyond the scope of this 
article.  
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would likely have deleterious effects not only on consumers, but also 
on the long-term soundness and stability of our financial system. 
 
II. The Financial Services Industry and Its Congressional 
Allies Strongly Opposed CFPB’s Creation and Have 
Sought to Undermine Its Autonomy and Authority 
 
A. The Industry’s Efforts to Prevent the 
Establishment of CFPB 
 
During 2009 and 2010, financial industry trade groups—
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers 
Association—waged an aggressive campaign to defeat the Obama 
Administration’s proposal to establish an independent consumer 
financial protection agency.14 From the beginning of the debates over 
Dodd-Frank, industry associations and their members gave “top 
priority [to] killing President Obama’s proposal,”15 because they 
viewed CFPB as an “unneeded, intrusive new agency that would 
increase the[ir] cost of doing business.”16 The financial services 
industry urged Congress to leave the responsibility for protecting 

14 Jacoby, supra note 12, at 99 (describing the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s campaign against the creation of a consumer financial 
protection agency); see also, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, The CFPA: How a 
crusade to protect consumers lost its steam, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at 
G01 (reporting that “[b]usiness groups – most vociferously the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association – have 
campaigned fiercely” against the proposed new agency); Phil Mattingly & 
Carter Dougherty, Senate Republicans Plan to Block Consumer Bureau 
While Seeking Changes, BLOOMBERG, May 6, 2011, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/republican-senators-to-block-consumer-
nominee-absent-changes-1-.html (“Banking lobbyists fought the [CFPB] 
from its inception. . . . The U.S. Chamber of Commerce pledged millions of 
dollars to ‘kill’ the bureau, running campaign advertisements and working a 
grassroots campaign that resulted in more than 200,000 letters designed to 
sway lawmakers . . . .”). 
15 Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at B1; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 10, 
at 198 (explaining that “[t]he banking lobby and its defenders closed ranks 
against” the proposed agency); Paul Wiseman et al., Big Job Looms for New 
Consumer Protection Agency, USA TODAY, June 24, 2010, at 1B 
(“Financial industry lobbyists have fought the new agency through every 
step of the legislative process.”).  
16 Kaiser, supra note 14. 
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consumers of financial services with the federal banking agencies in 
order to ensure that any new consumer safeguards did not impair the 
“safety and soundness” of financial institutions.17 
Republican members of Congress supported the financial 
services industry by strongly objecting to the creation of any 
independent consumer financial protection agency and by insisting 
that the consumer protection function must “remain with federal 
banking regulators.”18 Republican leaders in the Senate bitterly 
opposed the proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) to 
establish an independent CFPB within the Fed. The disagreement 
over CFPB ultimately prevented any bipartisan agreement on Dodd-
Frank’s terms.19  

17 Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14; see also R. Christian Bruce, 
Regulatory Reform: Summers Urges Speed on Bank Reforms, Says 
Consumer Protection Agency Essential, 93 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 506 
(Sept. 22, 2009) (“[T]he Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial 
Services Roundtable, and 23 other business groups said creating a stand-
alone consumer protection agency with broad powers ‘is not the correct 
approach.’ Instead . . . existing regulatory agencies could be given beefed-
up powers.”).  
18 Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: State Attorneys General Make Push 
For Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 94 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 
309 (Feb. 16, 2010) (quoting argument by Senator Richard Shelby, the 
ranking Republican member of the Senate Banking Committee, that 
“consumer protection and safety and soundness regulation . . . must be 
integrated with each other, not separated from each other”); Kaiser, supra 
note 14 (quoting Senator Shelby’s view that an independent agency would 
be “a folly and dangerous”). 
19 See Cheyenne Hopkins, Oversight by House GOP to Shape Rules, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1 (“Of all the parts in the [Dodd-Frank] bill, the 
GOP objected most strenuously to the creation of a consumer protection 
agency . . . .”); Stacy Kaper, Dodd Recounts Battles Over Reg Reform, AM. 
BANKER, Aug. 24, 2010, at 1 (reporting that attempts by Senator Dodd to 
agree on a bipartisan bill with Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) “broke 
down” because of Republican “hostility” to CFPB’s creation); James 
Rowley & Lisa Lerer, Consumer Agency Still ‘Elephant’ in Room for 
Finance Debate, BLOOMBERG, May 3, 2010, http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2010-05-03/consumer-protection-still-elephant-in-room-for-
financal-overhaul-debate.html (describing the view of Senator Bob Corker 
(R-TN) that CFPB’s creation was “the most contentious issue” during the 
Senate’s consideration of Dodd-Frank and was “the elephant in the room” 
that prevented any bipartisan agreement on Dodd-Frank). 
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After Republicans failed to block CFPB’s creation, they 
introduced an amendment on the Senate floor that would have 
significantly reduced CFPB’s powers and removed its independence. 
The Republican amendment would have placed the bureau firmly 
under FDIC’s control and would have barred the bureau from 
examining or regulating depository institutions.20 That amendment 
was supported by all but three Republican Senators, but it was 
defeated by the Democratic majority in the Senate.21  
During the final Senate debates on Dodd-Frank, Senator 
Shelby declared that CFPB would impose “massive new regulatory 
burdens on businesses, large and small” and would “stifle innovation 
in consumer financial products.”22 Other Republican members of 
Congress similarly alleged that CFPB would wield vast and 
unaccountable powers with devastating consequences for American 
businesses and consumers.23 Republican legislators warned that 
CFPB would be likely to adopt rules that could threaten the “safety 

20 Senator Shelby’s amendment (S. 3826) would have (i) designated CFPB 
as a division of FDIC, subject to FDIC’s oversight, (ii) required CFPB to 
obtain FDIC approval before issuing any rule, and (iii) exempted all 
depository institutions and most nonbank financial institutions from CFPB’s 
jurisdiction. 156 CONG. REC. S3325-26 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of 
Rep. Menendez).  
21 Senator Shelby’s amendment failed by a vote of 38-61. All fifty-nine 
Democratic Senators and two Republican Senators (Charles Grassley and 
Olympia Snowe) voted against the amendment, while another Republican 
(Senator Robert Bennett) did not vote. Id. at S3327–28 (reporting the roll 
call vote on S. 3826). 
22 156 CONG. REC. S5877 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (remarks of Rep. 
Shelby). 
23 See, e.g., id. at S5884 (remarks of Sen. Kyl, asserting that CFPB “will 
have latitude to impose its will, with few checks and balances, on American 
credit providers, all of which will result in more expense, more regulation, 
higher costs for consumers, and less availability of credit”); id. at S5816 
(daily ed. July 14, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Bond, declaring that CFPB would 
be a “new superbureaucracy with unprecedented power” and its “decisions 
on credit will be driven by the administration’s political will and agenda”); 
id. at S3321-22 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Enzi, claiming that 
CFPB would become “the single most powerful agency in the Federal 
Government” and would exercise “unchecked power[,]” thereby creating 
rules that would be “bad for small businesses and our communities, and . . . 
bad for individual consumer choices and freedoms”); see also Jacoby, supra 
note 142, at 100 n.6, 101 n.9 (quoting similar statements by Republican 
members of Congress who opposed CFPB’s creation).  
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and soundness” of financial institutions, notwithstanding any 
objections raised by federal banking agencies.24 Dodd-Frank passed 
by substantial margins in both houses of Congress, but only three 
Republican House members and three Republican Senators voted in 
favor of the legislation.25 
 
B. The Industry’s Post-Dodd-Frank Campaign to 
Weaken CFPB 
 
As soon as Dodd-Frank was passed, the financial services 
industry and its Republican allies began a new campaign to reduce 
CFPB’s independence and authority. During the midterm elections of 
2010, financial institutions and their trade groups gave a significant 
majority of their political contributions to Republican congressional 
candidates. The financial services industry’s strong backing for 
Republican candidates in 2010 represented a sharp reversal from the 
industry’s political behavior in 2006 and 2008, when the industry 
gave a majority of its financial support to Democratic candidates. 
The financial industry’s shift in contributions reflected the industry’s 

24 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5816 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (remarks of 
Sen. Bond) (“Politics will then decide how to allocate credit while operating 
outside the framework of safety and soundness, thus putting more risk back 
into the system when we were supposed to be taking risk out of the 
system."); id. at S3868 (daily ed. May 18, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Corker)  
(“The consumer protection agency has the ability to write rules with no veto 
authority against the safety and soundness of financial institutions."); id. at 
S3312 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Shelby) (“Under the Dodd 
bill, the [CFPB] would issue new rules without considering their impact on 
safety and soundness of financial institutions.”). 
25 Mike Ferrulo, Regulatory Reform: House Clears Financial Reform Bill 
Along Party Lines, Senate Action Delayed, 95 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 5 
(July 6, 2010) (reporting that Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 237-192 in 
the House, and stating that “[t]hree Republicans voted for the bill and 19 
Democrats voted against it.”); Mike Ferrulo et al., Regulatory Reform: 
Senate Sends Financial Regulatory To White House for President’s 
Signature, 95 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 90 (July 20, 2010) (reporting that 
Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 60-39 in the Senate, and stating that 
Republican Senators Scott Brown, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe voted 
in favor of Dodd-Frank while Senator Russ Feingold “was the sole 
Democrat in opposition”). 
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anger and frustration over Dodd-Frank’s passage and CFPB’s 
creation.26 
The Republicans secured control of the House and captured 
several additional seats in the Senate. Following the 2010 elections, 
Republican congressional leaders announced plans to introduce 
legislation that would change CFPB’s structure and weaken its 
independence.27 During the spring of 2011, Republican leaders in the 
House introduced bills that would (i) establish a multimember board 
to govern CFPB, (ii) give federal prudential regulators a stronger 
potential veto over CFPB’s rulemaking, and (iii) enable Congress to 

26 For discussions of the financial services industry’s decision to shift its 
political support from Democrats to Republicans, due to the industry’s 
resentment over Dodd-Frank’s passage and CFPB’s establishment, see T.W. 
Farnham & Paul Kane, Democratic campaign committees losing big Wall 
Street donors, WASH. POST, July 6, 2010, at A01(“A revolt among big 
donors on Wall Street is hurting fundraising for the Democrats' two 
congressional campaign committees, with contributions from the world's 
financial capital down 65 percent from two years ago.”); Stacy Kaper, 
Banks Use Election as Payback for Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 
2010, at 1 (“Though Democrats scored a big political victory in passing 
regulatory reform, many are already paying for it as the financial services 
industry directs more of its contributions toward Republicans and moderates 
who tried to pare back the revamp.”); Brody Mullins & Alicia Mundy, 
Corporate Political Giving Swings Toward the GOP, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 
2010, at A5 (“Corporations have begun to send a majority of donations  
from their political action committees to Republican candidates, a reversal 
from the trend of the past three years.”); Robert Schmidt, Wall Street 
Banking on Republicans to Push Legislative Goals, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 14, 
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-14/wall-street-banking-on-
republicans-to-push-legislative-goals.html (“Financial firms . . . for most of 
this year have been shifting political contributions to Republicans . . . .”); 
see also Kevin Wack, Big Banks Electing to Give Obama Less Cash, AM. 
BANKER, Aug. 30, 2011, at 1 (reporting that “[m]any bankers are still 
particularly angry about Dodd-Frank, which they view as regulatory 
overkill”). 
27 Clea Benson & Phil Mattingly, Firms That Fought Dodd-Frank May 
Profit Under Republican House, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2010, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-03/companies-that-fought-dodd-frank-may-
profit-under-republican-u-s-house.html; Stacy Kaper, Review 2010/Preview 
2011: Redrawing the Battle Lines on Reform, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 
1; Stacy Kaper, ELECTIONS 2010: Bachus Plots Agenda, But Faces 
Leadership Challenge, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 2010, at 4. 
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control CFPB’s budget through the appropriations process.28 
Financial industry trade groups and major banks strongly supported 
Republican efforts to reduce CFPB’s autonomy and authority, and 
they urged House members to pass the Republican bills.29  
On July 21, 2011 (the first anniversary of Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment), the House of Representatives passed legislation that 
would (i) create a five-member commission to oversee CFPB, (ii) 
suspend all of CFPB’s powers until the Senate confirmed a Director 
of CFPB, and (iii) expand the authority of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to veto CFPB’s regulations.30 Under 

28 Kate Davidson, Subcommittee Approves Bills to Revamp CFPB, AM. 
BANKER, May 5, 2011, at 3; Brady Dennis & Ylan Q. Mui, Fight over 
consumer bureau about to enter next phase ,WASH. POST, May 4, 2011, at 
A17; Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: GOP Lawmakers Take First 
Legislative Steps to Restructure New Consumer Bureau, 96 BNA’S 
BANKING REPORT 850 (May 10, 2011); Cheyenne Hopkins, Political 
Sniping Dominates House Hearing on the CFPB, AM. BANKER, Apr. 7, 
2011, at 3; Jennifer Liberto, Republicans aim to weaken consumer bureau, 
CNN MONEY, Apr. 6, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/news/ 
economy/republicans_consumer_bureau/index.htm. 
29 See, e.g., Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14 (reporting that the 
American Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, Bank of America, 
Citigroup and Capital One lobbied in support of the Republican-backed 
House bills to change CFPB); New consumer agency under fire from GOP, 
banks, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Mar. 16, 2011 (describing support for 
Republican legislation among financial industry trade groups); Memo from 
Floyd Stoner, Exec. Vice President, Am. Bankers Assoc., to Members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/76DCD307-2D7E-48A6-A10F-
623175F0AEAD/72899/HouseMemoreCFPBBill072011.pdf (expressing 
support for Republican legislation to change CFPB); Letter from Richard 
Hunt, President of the Consumer Bankers Assoc., to Representative Shelley 
Moore Capito (May 3, 2011). 
30 Kate Davidson & Joe Adler, As CFPB Takes Flight, GOP Bill Aims to 
Clip Its Wings, AM. BANKER, July 22, 2011, at 2 (“The legislation . . . would 
replace the agency's director with a five-member commission, mak[ing] it 
easier for other regulators to override its rules and suspend its powers until a 
permanent leader is in place.”); Mike Ferullo, Consumer Protection: House 
Approves Legislation to Alter CFPB As Agency Gets Underway: Obama 
Vows Veto, 97 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 163 (July 26, 2011) (stating that 
the House bill (H.R. 1315) passed by a vote of 241-173 and all but one 
Republican member voted for the bill, while all but ten Democratic 
members voted against it). 
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the House bill, a majority of FSOC’s members could vote to override 
any CFPB regulation that they found to be inconsistent with the safe 
and sound operations of U.S. financial institutions, and CFPB would 
be barred from participating in any override vote by FSOC.31 In 
contrast, as discussed below, Dodd-Frank permits FSOC to veto a 
CFPB regulation only if two-thirds of FSOC’s members (including 
CFPB) determine that the challenged regulation would threaten the 
safety and soundness of the entire U.S. banking system or the 
stability of the entire U.S. financial system.32 Republicans also 
sponsored a separate House bill that would make all of CFPB’s 
funding subject to congressional appropriations by 2013.33 
 Republicans in the Senate actively supported the efforts of 
their House colleagues. On May 5, 2011, Senator Richard Shelby and 
forty-three other Republican Senators declared that they would block 
Senate confirmation of any CFPB Director until Congress passed 
legislation that incorporated the three principal changes included in 
the House bills.34 Senator Shelby and his Republican colleagues 
demanded that Congress establish a multimember board to govern 
CFPB, give federal banking agencies a “safety-and-soundness check” 
over CFPB’s rules and ensure congressional control over CFPB’s 
budget.35 The American Bankers Association applauded the 

31 Larry Bivins, House passes Duffy bill, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 21, 
2011 (available on Lexis).   
32 See infra note 114͹ and accompanying text. 
33 Thecla Fabian, Appropriations: Obama Opposes Financial Services 
Elements Within House Spending Bill as It Nears Floor, 97 BNA’S 
BANKING REPORT 112 (July 19, 2011) (describing H.R. 2434, which would 
“make CFPB’s funding subject to the annual appropriations process 
beginning in fiscal 2013”); Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: House 
GOP Seeks Control of CFPB Funding As Agency Readies for July 21 Start 
Date, 96 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 1137 (June 21, 2011) (discussing 
introduction of the measure by House Republicans). 
34 Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: Republican Senators Vow to Block 
Nominee For CFPB Without Changes to New Agency, 96 BNA’S BANKING 
REPORT 849 (May 10, 2011) (describing letter sent by Republican Senators 
to President Obama); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14 
(reporting that “[t]he structural changes proposed by the senators in their 
letter echo proposals advancing in the Republican-controlled House”). 
35 News Release by Richard Shelby, United States Senator, Alabama, 44 
U.S. Sens. To Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation (May 5, 2011), 
available at http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases? 
ID=893bc8b0-2e73-4555-8441-d51e0ccd1d17 (citing to “text of [a] letter to 
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Republican Senators for insisting on those changes as a precondition 
for confirming any Director of CFPB.36  
 During the Senate Banking Committee's hearing on July 19, 
2011, Senator Shelby again maintained that the CFPB was a “huge 
new and entirely unaccountable bureaucracy” that lacked any 
“meaningful congressional oversight.”37 Senator Shelby repeated the 
Republican demands for fundamental changes in CFPB’s 
governance, funding and authority. Witnesses for the American 
Bankers Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly 
supported Senator Shelby’s position at the hearing.38 The financial 
services industry also continued its pattern of giving the great 
majority of its contributions to Republican leaders in 2011, thereby 
rewarding Republicans for their vigorous opposition to Dodd-Frank 
and CFPB.39 

President Obama, declaring, inter alia, that ‘[t]he present structure of 
[CFPB] . . . violates basic principles of accountability . . . .’”). Two 
Republican Senators – Scott Brown of Massachusetts and Lisa Murkowski 
of Alaska – did not sign Senator Shelby’s letter; Mattingly & Dougherty, 
supra note 14. 
36 Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14 (quoting statement by Frank 
Keating, head of the American Bankers Association).  
37 Thecla Fabian, Consumer Protection: Senate Banking Hearing Highlights 
Continued CFPB Structure, ‘Accountability’ Stalemate, 97 BNA’S 
BANKING REPORT 165 (July 26, 2011) (quoting Senator Shelby’s opening 
statement at a hearing of the Senate Banking Committee on July 19, 2011). 
In a contemporary op-ed, Senator Shelby denounced the CFPB as “the most 
powerful yet unaccountable bureaucracy in the federal government.” 
Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable ‘Consumer-Protection’ 
Czar, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2011, at A17. During a Senate committee 
hearing on September 6, 2011, Senator David Vitter (R-LA) similarly 
argued that “[t]here’s a real danger of the CFPB being a super bureaucracy 
that does a lot of damage to the economy by overreaching in its attempts to 
make decisions for consumers.” Kate Davidson, Cordray Hearing Devolves 
into Partisan Fight Over CFPB Structure, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 2011. 
38 Fabian, supra note 37. 
39 Jonathan D. Salant & Lisa Lerer, Romney Lures Obama Wall Street 
Donors, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-09-27/romney-lures-obama-wall-street-donors-in-race-for-campaign-
cash.html (“Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney has raised more 
than twice as much money from Wall Street as Barack Obama . . . .”); 
Wack, supra note 26 (“In 2008, Barack Obama was the toast of Wall Street. 
But so far in the 2012 race, the six largest U.S. banks have switched sides in 
a dramatic way, and are giving far more money to GOP hopeful Mitt 
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Meanwhile, a contemporaneous poll commissioned by 
Consumer Reports reported that 74% of respondents favored the 
creation of CFPB as an independent agency with the sole mission of 
protecting consumers of financial services. The poll showed that 
large majorities of Democrats, independents and Republicans 
supported CFPB and its mission.40 More than four-fifths of the poll 
respondents agreed that CFPB’s “top priorities” should include 
“strengthening and enforcing rules against deceptive and unfair 
practices” by financial institutions and “requiring that mortgage and 
other documents be easier for consumers to understand.”41 
Nearly three-quarters of the poll’s respondents also 
supported Dodd-Frank as a whole, including a majority of 

Romney than they are to the sitting president. . . . While Obama has touted 
Dodd-Frank as an achievement of his first term, Romney has criticized the 
law.”); Kevin Wack, GOP Fundraising Beats Dems’, AM. BANKER, Aug. 
31, 2011, at 3 (reporting that Rep. Spencer Bachus and Sen. Richard Shelby, 
the Republican leaders on the House and Senate banking committees, had 
received much larger amounts of campaign contributions in 2011 than their 
Democratic counterparts, Rep. Barney Frank and Sen. Tim Johnson, and a 
larger percentage of the Republicans’ contributions came from the financial 
services industry); William Selway & Martin Z. Baum, Derivatives: Bachus 
Is Wall Street’s Man in Jefferson County, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
May 31 – June 5, 2011, at 32 (observing that Rep. Bachus was a “leading 
critic of the Dodd-Frank law” and “the third-biggest recipient of donations 
from financial companies” over the past two decades); Gary Rivlin, The 
Billion Dollar Bank Heist: How the financial industry is buying off 
Washington – and killing reform, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2011, at 9 
(describing the financial services industry’s large contributions to 
Republican leaders who opposed Dodd-Frank and CFPB, including Rep. 
Sean Duffy (R-WI), who described CFPB as a “rogue agency” with an 
“authoritarian structure”).  
40 Chris Morran, Poll: Overwhelming Majority of Voters Want a Strong, 
Undiluted CFPB, CONSUMERIST, July 19, 2011 (stating that “83% of 
Democrats, 73% of independents and 68% of Republicans” expressed 
support in the poll for a strong CFPB) (Newstex Web Blog available on 
Lexis). 
41 New Poll Shows Strong Support for Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, PR NEWSWIRE, July 20, 2011 (describing press release issued by 
Consumers Union summarizing the poll’s results); see also Jim 
Puzzanghera, GOVERNMENT: Fight over watchdog continues, L.A. TIMES, 
July 21, 2011, at B1 (“Advocacy group Consumers Union on Wednesday 
released results of a recent poll showing that 74% of respondents supported 
the new bureau.”). 
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Republican respondents.42 Given the strong public backing for CFPB 
and Dodd-Frank, as well as widespread popular hostility toward 
large financial institutions, Republican leaders evidently concluded 
that their most prudent course of action would be to push for 
legislation imposing tight restrictions on CFPB instead of seeking to 
eliminate the bureau.43 Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) alleged 
that the Republican-backed House legislation “is as close as 
[Republicans] dare come now, because of public opinion, to 
abolishing the whole agency. . . . They do understand that politically 
it’s not a good idea to be fully straightforward about their intentions, 
and they’d really like to repeal it.”44   
In October 2011, the Senate Banking Committee approved 
President Obama’s nomination of Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s 
first Director by a party-line vote of 12-10, with all Republican 
committee members voting against the nomination.45 Two months 

42 Kevin Wack, Why GOP Changed Its Dodd-Frank Strategy, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 1, 2011, at 1 (reporting that “[71%] of the poll’s respondents favored 
Dodd-Frank as a whole, including 60% of Republicans”); see also Jonathan 
Chait, TRB from Washington: Dithering Heights: Obama shows a new level 
of passivity on financial reform, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 2011, at 2 (stating 
that “[p]olls in 2010 showed overwhelming support for strong financial 
regulation, and what little information has come out since suggests strong 
anti-Wall Street sentiment remains”). 
43 Wack, supra note 42; Rivlin, supra note 39; see also Andrew Edgecliffe-
Johnson & Francesco Guerrera, US public loses faith in business, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c60c01ba-27e5-11e0-
8abc-00144feab49a.html#axzz1o5AWnRxq (reporting that “the number of 
Americans who trust US banks has dropped to a low of 25 per cent, down 
from 33 per cent a year ago and 71 per cent before the financial crisis”); 
Richard Burnett, Consumers unhappy with banks, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Dec. 23, 2010, at B5; Americans’ anger not easing over banks’ practices, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 10, 2010, at P3D. 
44 Davidson & Adler, supra note 30 (quoting Rep. Frank). Similarly, Senate 
Banking Committee chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) criticized Republican 
Senators for their “misleading claim of no CFPB accountability” and 
declared that Republicans were trying to “destroy the Bureau’s ability to do 
its job of protecting American consumers . . . .” Davidson, supra note 37. 
45 Kate Davidson, Senate Panel Approves Nomination for CFPB Director, 
AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 2011; Carter Dougherty, Consumer Bureau 
Nomination Goes to Senate, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 6, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/consumer-bureau-nominee-
approved-by-senate-banking-committee.html (“Today's 12-10 vote sends 
the nomination to the full Senate . . . .”); Jessica Wehrman, Confirmation 
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later, forty-five Republican Senators (more than enough to sustain a 
filibuster) voted to block the Senate’s confirmation of Mr. Cordray. 
At the same time, Senate Republican leaders reaffirmed their 
intention to prevent confirmation of any nominee for Director until 
Congress passed legislation to satisfy their demands for changes in 
CFPB’s governance, authority and funding.46  
By preventing Senate confirmation of any Director, 
Republicans and the financial services industry greatly reduced 
CFPB’s ability to exercise the powers that Dodd-Frank conferred on 
CFPB on July 21, 2011. According to a joint legal opinion prepared 
by the Inspectors General (“IGs”) of the Treasury Department and 
the Fed, CFPB may take the following actions without a Senate-
confirmed Director: (i) issuing rules, orders and guidance under 
existing federal consumer financial laws that were enforced by other 
federal agencies prior to the transfer of their functions to CFPB on 
July 21, 2011, (ii) enforcing previous orders, agreements and other 
rulings issued by those agencies under such laws, and (iii) examining 
depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion.47 

Battle: Cordray passes first test, but that may be it, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 2011, at 1A. 
46 Carter Dougherty, Senate Republicans Block Cordray for CFPB, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-
12-08/senate-republicans-block-obama-nominee-cordray-as-head-of-
consumer-bureau.html; Kevin Wack, Senate Republicans Block Cordray 
Nomination, AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 2011. All 52 Democratic Senators and 
one Republican Senator – Scott Brown (R-MA) – voted in favor of Mr. 
Cordray’s confirmation. Id. 
47 In reaching this conclusion, the Inspectors General relied on Section 
1066(a) of Dodd-Frank. Section 1066(a) authorizes the Treasury Secretary 
to perform the functions prescribed under Sections 1061-67 of Dodd-Frank 
(dealing with the transfer of consumer financial protection functions from 
other agencies) “until the Director of [CFPB] is confirmed by the Senate.” 
Dodd-Frank § 1066(a). See Letter from Eric M. Thorson and Elizabeth A. 
Coleman to Rep. Spencer Bachus and Rep. Judy Biggert, forwarding “Joint 
Response by the Inspectors General of the Department of the Treasury and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Request for Information 
Regarding the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,” at 4-6, (Jan. 10, 
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/ig/Documents/OIG-CA%2011004%20Committee%20of%20 
Financial%20Services%20Response%20CFPB.pdf (“If the Bureau does not 
have a Senate-confirmed Director by the designated transfer date, the 
Bureau may continue to operate under the Secretary's section 1066(a) 
authority.”).  
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However, the Fed and Treasury IGs concluded that CFPB must have 
a Senate-confirmed Director in order to exercise its other powers 
under Dodd-Frank, including (1) prescribing rules under new 
statutory authorities not transferred from other federal agencies, (2) 
issuing rules and orders prohibiting unfair, deceptive and abusive 
acts and practices, and (3) supervising nondepository providers of 
consumer financial services.48  
Thus, according to the joint opinion of the Fed and Treasury 
IGs, “[u]ntil the Senate confirms a director, the CFPB cannot oversee 
non-bank lenders or assume enhanced consumer protection powers 
mandated under [Dodd-Frank].”49 Assuming the correctness of that 
opinion, the absence of a Senate-confirmed Director would prevent 
CFPB from establishing the type of consumer financial protection 
regime envisioned by Dodd-Frank—namely, a regime that ensures a 
“level playing field for all banks and . . . nondepository financial 
companies” and that “ha[s] enough flexibility to address future 
problems as they arise.”50 Although CFPB’s inability to regulate 
nonbanks appeared to disadvantage banks, some bankers were 
prepared to accept an uneven playing field as long as it included a 
referee (i.e., CFPB) with sharply limited powers.51  

48 Letter from Thorson & Coleman, supra note 47, at 6-7. See infra note 68 
and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s authority to supervise and 
examine nondepository providers of consumer financial services). 
49 Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: House Approves Legislation to Alter 
CFPB As Agency Gets Underway; Obama Vows Veto, 97 BNA’S BANKING 
REPORT 163, 163 (July 26, 2011); see also Kate Davidson, Leaderless 
CFPB Not a Blessing for Bankers, AM. BANKER, July 12, 2011, at 1 
(describing limitations on CFPB’s authority without a Director). 
50 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010); see also Davidson, supra note 49, at 1 
(quoting Amy Friend, former Senate Banking Committee chief counsel, 
who explained that “[t]he objective in creating [CFPB] was to have an 
agency that would focus more on consumer protection than the banking 
agencies had, and would be able to fully scrutinize larger nonbanks in 
particular”). 
51 See Davidson, supra note 49, at 1 (stating that “some bankers are secretly 
gleeful the [CFPB] does not yet have a director”). As discussed supra in 
note 13, President Obama issued a recess appointment in January 2012 to 
install Richard Cordary as CFPB’s first Director. However, the validity of 
that appointment was disputed by Republican members of Congress, and 
some observers predicted that adversely affected parties would file lawsuits 
to challenge Mr. Cordray’s future rulemaking and enforcement actions as 
Director. Maria Aspan, Cordray Recess Appointment Will ‘Weaken’ CFPB 
– Barofsky, AM. BANKER Jan. 6, 2012, at 1 (quoting Neil Barofsky, former 
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For example, Andrew Kahr, (founder of Providian, the 
highly controversial credit card bank), argued in July 2011 that banks 
should prefer a leaderless CFPB, notwithstanding any concerns about 
the lack of a “level playing field” with nonbanks.52 Mr. Kahr argued 
that “[f]or at least 200 years, banks have benefited from a playing 
field tilted sharply in [their] favor,” and “[t]hat’s why nonbanks want 
to own banks.”53 However, Mr. Kahr warned: 
 

special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, who 
warned that Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment had created “legal 
uncertainties and litigation that are ‘going to weaken the [CFPB]’”); Kate 
Davidson, Will Cordray Recess Appointment Cloud CFPB’s Future?, AM. 
BANKER, Jan. 5, 2012, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment 
“set the stage for a showdown over the [CFPB’s] authority that could take 
years to resolve”).  
52 Andrew Kahr, Let’s Keep the CFPB Leaderless, AM. BANKER, July 26, 
2011, at 6 [hereinafter Kahr, CFPB Leaderless]. According to one of his 
previous op-eds, Mr. Kahr “is a principal in Credit Builders LLC, a 
financial product development company, and was the founding chief 
executive of Providian Financial Corp.” Andrew Kahr, It’s Official: 
‘Prepaid’ Cards Face Cap, AM. BANKER, July 6, 2011, at 8 [hereinafter 
Kahr, It's Official]. Mr. Kahr was CEO of Providian from the early 1980s to 
1988, and he subsequently served as a consultant to Providian from 1988 to 
2000. According to one news account, he was “the genius behind 
Providian’s success” in marketing high-cost credit cards to high-risk 
borrowers during the 1990s. Sam Zuckerman, How Providian Misled Card 
Holders, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 5, 2002, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/05/05/MN138910.DTL. In 2000, Providian 
paid $300 million to settle enforcement actions brought by state and federal 
officials alleging deceptive and predatory lending practices. “Mr. Kahr was 
not charged with wrongdoing,” but his “consulting contract was ended in 
2000." Id.; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules 
Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual 
Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 225, 315-16 (2004) (referring to enforcement actions against Providian); 
see also Duncan A. MacDonald, Comptroller Has Duty to Clean Up Card 
Pricing Mess, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 2003, at 17 (publishing a letter from a 
former general counsel of Citigroup’s European and North American credit 
card businesses, who alleged that Providian’s “telemarketing and pricing 
practices . . . bordered on the criminal. For a decade Providian had been 
well known in the [credit] card industry as the poster child of abusive 
consumer practices”). 
53 Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6. 
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[O]nce a director is confirmed banks will suffer 
severely. The CFPB will then have the power, under 
Dodd-Frank, to prohibit 'unfair' practices by banks. 
(Until the CFPB has a director, no regulator has that 
power.) 
. . .  
[Consider a scenario in which] the Republicans 
control both houses of Congress after the 2012 
election. We might then hope for some rollback of 
CFPB authority. Even if there’s only one chance in 
four of that, banks should prefer to avoid 
promulgation of very costly regulations and 
enforcement actions based on the CFPB’s new 
powers until that election.54 
 
Mr. Kahr added (perhaps in jest), “Let the bad times roll!”55 In 
explaining why banks should oppose a Senate-confirmed CFPB 
Director, Mr. Kahr noted that a CFPB Director would have authority 
to condemn “unfair” consumer financial products, which could 
potentially include $39 bank overdraft fees and high-cost “credit 
protection products” offered by banks.56 Mr. Kahr pointed out that 

54 Id. 
55 Id. In a 1999 memo to a Providian executive, Mr. Kahr observed, 
“Making people pay for access to credit is a lucrative business wherever it is 
practiced. . . . The trick is charging a lot, repeatedly, for small doses of 
incremental credit.” Zuckerman, supra note 52 (quoting March 1999 memo 
from Mr. Kahr to Providian Executive Vice President David Alvarez). In a 
1998 memo to Providian executives, Mr. Kahr recommended that Providian 
should not disclose that some of its credit cards lacked any “grace period” 
before customer payments were due. Instead of a “no grace period” 
disclosure, Mr. Kahr suggested that Providian should use “one of the 
numerous ideas for a ‘limited’ grace period that have been put forward. 
‘Limited’ meaning that the customer responds to (it) as if there were a grace 
period, but in reality almost no one gets the benefit of it.” Id. (quoting July 
1998 memo from Mr. Kahr to Mr. Alvarez and Dawn Greiner, Providian’s 
head of new product development).   
56 Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6; see also infra notes 606, 111 
and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s authority to prohibit “unfair” 
acts or practices). Mr. Kahr’s concern that CFPB might act to regulate 
overdraft fees was not misplaced. In September 2011, Raj Date, assistant to 
the Treasury Secretary for administering CFPB, indicated that the bureau 
would take a “closer look” at overdraft programs. Kate Davidson, New 
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bank regulators permitted profit margins for bank credit protection 
products that were much higher than the profit margins allowed by 
state insurance regulators for similar products sold by insurance 
companies. In Mr. Kahr’s view, that differential provided “yet 
another example of a very unlevel playing field, enormously 
favorable to banks versus nonbanks.”57 Accordingly, he asked: “Is 
this the time to activate additional elements of [consumer 
compliance] regulation that can only render banks less profitable—
and perhaps more inclined to take greater risks in order to achieve 
adequate return?”58 
 
III. CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding Are Similar to 
Those of Other Financial Regulators 
 
CFPB’s powers, governance, and funding are hardly 
unprecedented among federal financial regulators. CFPB’s 
rulemaking and enforcement authorities resemble those of other 
federal bank regulators. CFPB’s leadership by a single director is 
similar to the governance structure of OCC and FHFA. CFPB’s 
ability to fund its operations without relying on congressional 
appropriations is comparable to other financial regulators except for 
CFTC and SEC. While the financial services industry and its 
Republican allies have vigorously attacked CFPB’s perceived 
independence, they have strongly defended the autonomy enjoyed by 
OCC and FHFA, which represent the closest regulatory analogues to 
CFPB's structure. Thus, it appears that the financial industry and its 
legislative supporters are primarily opposed to CFPB’s expected 
policy choices, not its structural characteristics.  
 

CFPB Leader Pledges ‘Tough’ Enforcement Regime, AM. BANKER, Sept. 
16, 2011, at 2 (summarizing a speech by Mr. Date on Sept. 15, 2011). 
57 Kahr, CFPB Leaderless supra note 52, at 6. For additional analysis of the 
advantages that banks – especially large banks – enjoy relative to nonbanks 
because of banks’ access to federal safety net subsidies, see Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1588-93 (2007); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-
Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957-59, 980-86 (2011) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem] (describing the enormous explicit and 
implicit subsidies that U.S. and foreign governments provided to “too-big-
to-fail” banks during the recent financial crisis).  
58 Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6. 
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A. CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding  
 
Title X of Dodd-Frank, designated as the “Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010” (“CFP Act”), establishes CFPB as 
an “independent bureau” within the FRB to “regulate the offering 
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the 
Federal consumer financial laws.”59 CFPB’s statutory mission is “to 
implement and . . . enforce Federal consumer financial law 
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have 
access to markets for consumer financial products and services [that] 
are fair, transparent, and competitive.”60 The “[f]ederal consumer 
financial law[s]” that fall within CFPB’s jurisdiction include 
eighteen previously enacted federal statutes, as well as the “new 
consumer financial protection mandates prescribed by the [CFP] 
Act.”61  
Title X provides that CFPB will be administered by a single 
Director.62 The President appoints CFPB’s Director for a five-year 
term with the Senate’s advice and consent, and the President may 
remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”63 The Director may issue rules, orders and 
guidance “to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of 
the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions 

59 Dodd-Frank § 1011(a); see generally Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The 
Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and Services, 
127 BANKING L. J. 722 (2010) (providing a helpful overview of CFPB's 
authority under Title X).  
60 Dodd–Frank § 1021(a). 
61 Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 724-25; see also Dodd-Frank § 
1002(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law” to include Title X of 
Dodd-Frank, eighteen federal consumer protection statutes that are 
enumerated in Dodd-Frank § 1002(12), and certain other laws).  
62 Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(1). As previously discussed, President Obama 
invoked his constitutional power of recess appointment and appointed 
Richard Cordray as CFPB’s first Director in January 2012. However, the 
validity of that appointment was disputed by Republican members of 
Congress and some analysts. See supra notes 13, 51. 
63 Id. § 1011(c). The Supreme Court has observed, in the context of a 
similar removal statute, that the quoted terms “are very broad and . . . could 
sustain removal of a [federal official] for any number of actual or perceived 
transgressions." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986). 
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thereof.”64 The Director also hires and manages CFPB’s employees.65 
CFPB may issue regulations to implement federal consumer financial 
laws and may also issue rules or orders to prohibit “unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) in consumer financial 
services.66 CFPB may also issue regulations to ensure that “the 
features of any consumer financial product or service . . . are fully, 
accurately, and, effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that 
permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks 
associated with the product or service.”67 
Further, Title X empowers CFPB to supervise and examine 
depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion (and their 
affiliates) as well as all nondepository providers of consumer 
financial services.68 CFPB may pursue a variety of enforcement 
powers to prevent violations of Title X and CFPB’s regulations 
thereunder, or any of the eighteen federal consumer financial statutes 
enumerated in Section 1002(12) of Dodd-Frank.69 CFPB’s 
enforcement authorities include (i) undertaking investigations and 
performing administrative discovery, (ii) initiating administrative 
enforcement proceedings, (iii) filing judicial enforcement actions, 
and (iv) referring criminal charges to the Department of Justice.70 

64 Dodd-Frank § 1022(a).  
65 Id. §1013(a). 
66 Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b), 1031(b). 
67 Id. § 1032(a).  
68 Depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less will be examined 
by federal banking agencies to assess their compliance with consumer 
financial protection laws. Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 731-32. CFPB 
has authority (i) to obtain reports from smaller depository institutions, (ii) to 
include one of CFPB’s examiners on the examination teams for such 
depository institutions, and (iii) to provide input to the primary regulators of 
such institutions with regard to the scope and conduct of examinations, the 
contents of examination reports and examination ratings. Dodd-Frank, § 
1026. 
69 Dodd-Frank, §§ 1002(12), 1031, 1036(a)(1)(B), 1052-1055. CFPB may 
not bring an administrative enforcement hearing to enforce an enumerated 
federal consumer financial law to the extent that the law in question 
specifically limits CFPB’s authority to do so. Id. § 1053(a)(2). 
70 Id. §§ 1052-56; see Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 732-35 
(describing CFPB’s enforcement powers). CFPB has authority to represent 
itself in the Supreme Court if it submits a request to the Attorney General 
and the Attorney General concurs or acquiesces in that request. Dodd-Frank 
§ 1054(e).  
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CFPB may use administrative or judicial proceedings to 
obtain a wide range of legal and equitable remedies, including 
refunds, restitution, damages, cease-and-desist orders, civil money 
penalties and injunctive relief.71 CFPB’s administrative and judicial 
enforcement powers are generally similar to those granted to federal 
banking agencies and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).72 Like 
the FTC, CFPB is statutorily barred from imposing punitive 
damages.73  
Thus, Title X vests CFPB with broadly-defined powers to 
regulate providers of consumer financial products and services.74 
However, CFPB may not regulate the ability of persons to carry on 
the businesses of insurance, securities, commodity trading, or 
managing employee benefit or compensation plans.75 In addition, 
sellers of nonfinancial goods and manufactured homes, real estate 
brokers, auto dealers, attorneys, accountants and tax preparers are not 
subject to CFPB’s jurisdiction unless they engage in offering covered 
financial products or services.76 
Title X protects CFPB’s autonomy in several ways. Title X 
prohibits FRB from taking any of the following actions: (i) 
intervening in any CFPB examination, enforcement action or other 
proceeding; (ii) appointing, directing or removing any CFPB officer 
or employee; (iii) combining CFPB or any of its functions with any 
other FRB unit; (iv) reviewing, approving, or delaying any CFPB 

71 Id. §§ 1053-1055.  
72 See infra notes 103-04 (discussing enforcement powers of federal banking 
agencies); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b, 57b-1 (2006) (prescribing the FTC’s 
enforcement authorities). 
73 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (prohibiting FTC from assessing punitive damages); 
Dodd-Frank, § 1055(a)(3) (imposing the same prohibition on CFPB). 
74 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1002(5), (6), (26) (defining “consumer financial 
product or service,” “covered person,” and “service provider”); Mierzewski 
et al., supra note 59, at 726 (describing persons, products and services that 
are regulated under Title X). 
75 Dodd-Frank § 1027(f)-(i), (m). 
76 See id. §§ 1027(a)-(e), 1029 (imposing further restrictions to the CFPB's 
regulatory authority); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731 (discussing exclusions from 
CFPB's jurisdiction for the above types of firms); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
160, 169–71 (2010) (same); Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 727-28 
(explaining that the listed exclusions apply "to the extent that the parties are 
not engaged in offering a consumer financial product or service, or are not 
separately subject to an enumerated consumer law"). 
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rule or order; or (v) reviewing or approving any legislative 
recommendations, testimony, or comments of CFPB’s Director.77 
Thus, Title X “makes clear that [CFPB] is to function without any 
interference by [FRB].”78  
In addition, Title X requires FRB to provide CFPB with 
annual funding up to a maximum limit of approximately $500 
million (to be adjusted for inflation).79 CFPB’s guaranteed funding 
from FRB is not subject to congressional appropriations.80 However, 
if CFPB determines that its guaranteed funding from the FRB is 
inadequate to carry out its responsibilities, CFPB must seek 
additional funds from Congress through the appropriations process.81 
 
B. Comparing the Powers, Governance and Funding 
of CFPB and Other Financial Regulators 
 
CFPB's powers are comparable to those of other federal 
financial regulators. As explained in the Senate report, Dodd-Frank’s 
provisions for CFPB were “modeled on similar statutes governing 
the [OCC] and the Office of Thrift Supervision [(“OTS”)], which are 
located within the Department of Treasury.”82 Dodd-Frank abolished 
OTS,83 but OCC continues to function as an autonomous bureau of 
the Treasury pursuant to the National Bank Act (“NBA”).84  

77 Dodd-Frank § 1012(c). 
78 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 161 (2010). 
79 FRB must provide annual funding to CFPB in an “amount determined by 
[CFPB’s] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out [CFPB’s] 
authorities” in view of other funding available to CFPB, up to the following 
maximum limits: "(i) 10% of the Fed’s 2009 operating expenses in fiscal 
year 2011, (ii) 11% of such expenses in fiscal year 2012, and (iii) 12% of 
such expenses in each subsequent fiscal year, with appropriate increases to 
reflect future inflation." Dodd-Frank § 1017(a). Dodd-Frank will require 
FRB to provide approximately $500 million of funding to CFPB in fiscal 
year 2013 and subsequent years. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 164 (2010) 
(graph). 
80 Dodd-Frank § 1017(a)(2)(C). 
81 Id. § 1017(e). 
82 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 161 (2010). 
83 Dodd-Frank § 313. Dodd-Frank transfers the functions of OTS to FDIC, 
FRB and OCC. Id. § 312.  
84 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 61-62 (4th 
ed. 2009). 
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Under the NBA, OCC is administered by a single official, 
the Comptroller of the Currency (“Comptroller”).85 Like the CFPB’s 
Director, the OCC's Comptroller is appointed by the President for a 
five-year term, with the advice and consent of the Senate.86 The 
Comptroller’s autonomy is similar to that of the CFPB's Director. 
The Treasury cannot prevent or delay the issuance of any OCC 
regulation, and the Treasury may not intervene in any matter before 
the Comptroller (including an agency enforcement action) unless 
specifically authorized by law.87  
FHFA is responsible for regulating Fannie Mae (“Fannie”), 
Freddie Mac (“Freddie”) and the Federal Home Loan Banks 
(“FHLBs”).88 Like the CFPB’s Director and the OCC's Comptroller, 
the FHFA’s Director serves as the single head of the agency.89 The 
FHFA Director’s mode of appointment and term of office are similar 
to the CFPB’s Director and the Comptroller. The President appoints 
the FHFA’s Director for a five-year term with the Senate’s advice 
and consent, but the President may also remove the FHFA’s Director 
“for cause.”90 In contrast to the single-agency-head model of CFPB, 

85 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
86 Id. § 2. The President may remove the Comptroller “upon reason[s] to be 
communicated by him to the Senate.” Id. As noted above, the President 
“may remove the Director [of CFPB] for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(c)(3). Thus, the President is not 
limited with respect to the “reasons” he may invoke to remove the 
Comptroller. On the other hand, the stated reasons for removal of the CFPB 
Director appear to provide broad discretion to the President. See supra note 
63 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986)).  
87 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1462a(b)(3).  
88 Id. §§ 4511, 4502(20) (establishing FHFA as the agency responsible for 
regulating Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs). Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs 
are generally referred to as “government-sponsored enterprises” (“GSEs”). 
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 31, 133. 
89 12 U.S.C. §§ 4512(a), 4513(a). The FHFA’s Director receives advice 
from the FHFA’s Oversight Board “with respect to overall strategies and 
policies,” but the Oversight Board “may not exercise any executive 
authority” over the FHFA. Id. § 4513a(a), (b).  
90 Id. § 4512(b). In contrast to the stipulated reasons for removal of the 
CFPB’s Director, the grounds representing “cause” for removal of the 
FHFA's Director are not specified in the governing statute. Compare Dodd-
Frank § 1011(c)(3) (providing that “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office” are permissible reasons for removing the CFPB's 
Director), with 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2) (providing that the FHFA's Director 
may be removed “for cause” without further specification).  
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OCC and FHFA, the FDIC and FRB are administered by multi-
member boards.91 
 All five of the foregoing financial regulators have substantial 
budgetary autonomy. OCC, FDIC, and FHFA fund their operations 
primarily by collecting fees and assessments from the institutions 
they regulate.92 FRB finances its operations from the earnings 
generated by its large portfolio of government securities and other 
investments.93 Thus, each of those four agencies is completely 
independent of congressional appropriations. In contrast, CFPB has 
substantial but not complete budgetary autonomy. As explained 
above, the independent funding that CFPB receives from FRB is 
capped at approximately $500 million, adjusted for future inflation, 
and CFPB is required to seek a congressional appropriation if it 
wishes to increase its budget beyond that amount. 
In some areas, CFPB’s regulatory powers are less extensive 
than those of FHFA and federal bank regulators. For example, FHFA 
may serve as conservator or receiver of any of its regulated entities.94 
FHFA has served as conservator for Fannie and Freddie since 
September 2008.95 FDIC has similar authority to act as conservator 
or receiver for any FDIC-insured national or state bank,96 or as 
receiver for any financial company whose failure “would have 
serious effects on financial stability in the United States.”97 CFPB 

91 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-63. Two other federal 
financial regulators – CFTC and SEC – are similarly administered by 
multimember commissions. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 1.3[1], at 27, § 22.7[1], at 752 n.28 (6th ed. 2009).  
92 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-63, 314-18; FEDERAL 
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2010, at 106 (2010) 
[hereinafter FHFA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.fhfa. 
gov/webfiles/21572/FHFA2010_RepToCongress6_13_11.pdf. 
93 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62. 
94 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2006). 
95 FHFA was appointed as conservator of Fannie and Freddie on September 
6, 2008, and it has continued to administer those conservatorships since that 
time. FHFA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 1-8.  
96 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 700-01; 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(c).  
97 Dodd-Frank §§ 203(b), 204; see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 865-66 
(2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (explaining 
that Title II of Dodd-Frank authorizes the Treasury Secretary to appoint 
FDIC as receiver of a financial company in order to “mitigate serious 
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States”).  
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does not have authority to act as conservator or receiver for any 
provider of consumer financial services. 
OCC exercises extensive supervisory powers over the 
structure and governance of national banks, including the authority to 
approve or deny applications for new charters, changes in the 
location of main offices and branches, opening of new branches, 
conversions into state banks, and mergers and consolidations with 
other depository institutions.98 CFPB does not possess comparable 
supervisory powers over providers of consumer financial services. 
Unlike CFPB, OCC is a “safety and soundness” regulator, and OCC 
therefore has prudential authority to regulate national banks with 
regard to such matters as capital adequacy, asset quality, competence 
and integrity of management, and adequacy of liquidity.99 FDIC and 
FRB have similar powers to regulate the safety and soundness of 
state banks and bank holding companies.100 Likewise, FHFA has 
broad authority to supervise the capital, assets, and liabilities of 
Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs for the purpose of promoting their 
safety and soundness.101  
In other respects, CFPB’s powers are similar to those of 
other financial regulators. CFPB, OCC, FDIC, FHFA and FRB all 
have authority to examine financial service providers subject to their 
respective jurisdictions in order to ensure compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations.102 All five regulators also have comprehensive 

98 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 27, 30, 36, 214, 214a, 215, 215a, 215a-1, 1828(c), 
1831u (2006) (outlining OCC’s powers over the structure and governance of 
national banks); see also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 73-
76, 86-89,191-95 (discussing OCC’s powers over national banks). 
99 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-62, 251-53, 279-93, 
627-35; Levitin, supra note 10, at 155-58. 
100 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62-63, 251- 53, 279-93, 
455-59, 627-35.  
101 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4611-4618, 4622-4624 (2010); see, e.g., id. § 4611(a)(1) 
(mandating that the FHFA’s Director must “establish risk-based capital 
requirements for [Fannie and Freddie] to ensure that [Fannie and Freddie] 
operate in a safe and sound manner”); id. § 4624(a) (requiring the FHFA’s 
Director to “establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of [Fannie 
and Freddie], to ensure that the holdings are backed by sufficient capital and 
consistent with the mission and the safe and sound operations of [Fannie 
and Freddie]”). 
102 For examination powers granted to OCC, FRB, FDIC and FHFA, see 12 
U.S.C. §§ 481, 483, 1820, 1844(c), 4517 (2006). For the CFPB Director’s 
powers to conduct examinations of nondepository providers of consumer 
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enforcement powers, including the authority to issue administrative 
cease-and-desist orders and civil money penalty orders.103 However, 
unlike the other four agencies, CFPB does not have authority to 
remove or suspend officers and directors of the companies it 
regulates.104  
 
C. Significant Statutory Limits on CFPB’s Powers 
 
As noted above, CFPB has broadly-defined powers to 
regulate providers of consumer financial services.105 However, Title 
X of Dodd-Frank imposes several significant limitations on the 
exercise of those powers. CFPB may not impose any usury limit on 
consumer credit transactions “unless explicitly authorized by law.”106 
Moreover, before it issues any regulation, CFPB must analyze “the 
potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered [providers of 
consumer financial services], including the potential reduction of 
access by consumers to consumer financial products or services 
resulting from such rule.”107 In particular, CFPB must assess the 
impact of any proposed rule on consumers in rural areas and 
depository institutions with assets of less than $10 billion.108 CFPB 

financial services and large depository institutions with more than $10 
billion in assets, see Dodd-Frank §§ 1024(b), 1025(a).  
103 For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue administrative cease-
and-desist orders and civil money penalty orders, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), 
1818(c), 1818(i). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. §§ 4581, 
4585, 4631, 4632, 4636. For CFPB’s authority to issue such orders, see 
Dodd-Frank §§ 1053, 1055. Unlike the FHFA, FRB and OCC, the FDIC 
and CFPB may also file court actions to obtain civil remedies against 
persons subject to their regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a)(Fourth) 
(outlining FDIC’s authority to file court suits); Dodd-Frank § 1054 
(outlining CFPB’s litigation authority). All five agencies may file judicial 
actions to enforce their administrative orders. See Dodd-Frank § 1053(d) 
(describing CFPB’s power to seek judicial enforcement of administrative 
orders); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (granting similar authority to FDIC, FRB and 
OCC); id. § 4635 (granting similar authority to FHFA).  
104 For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue orders removing or 
suspending officers and directors of regulated institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 
1818(e), 1818(g). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. § 4636a.  
105 See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text (outlining CFPB powers to 
regulate providers of consumer financial services). 
106 Dodd-Frank §1027(o). 
107 Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i). 
108 Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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must also consider (i) any expected increase in the cost of credit for 
small businesses that would result from the proposed rule, (ii) any 
alternatives that would accomplish CFPB’s statutory objectives and 
minimize any such increase in cost, and (iii) the advice and 
recommendations that CFPB’s small business advisory panel 
submitted with regard to the proposed rule.109   
  Thus, CFPB must take due account of the likely costs and 
benefits of each new rule, and it must evaluate the impact of each 
rule on consumers, providers of consumer financial services and 
small businesses. Title X’s requirement of a cost-benefit analysis for 
each new regulation makes CFPB’s rulemakings more vulnerable to 
judicial challenges and therefore encourages CFPB to adopt 
incremental rather than far-reaching rules.110     
Title X also imposes tight restrictions on CFPB’s UDAAP 
authority. CFPB may not issue a rule or order declaring an act or 
practice to be “unfair” unless the agency has a “reasonable basis to 
conclude” that (1) the act or practice is likely to cause a “substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers” and (2) that injury is “not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”111 Similarly, CFPB may 
not issue a rule or order declaring an act or practice to be “abusive” 
unless the act or practice either (a) “materially interferes” with a 
consumer’s ability to understand a financial product or service, or (b) 
“takes unreasonable advantage” of (i) a consumer’s lack of 
understanding of “the material risks, costs, or conditions” of the 
product or service, or (ii) the consumer’s inability to protect his or 
her interests in selecting or using that product or service, or (iii) the 
consumer’s reasonable reliance on the provider of that product or 
service.112  
Title X allows other federal financial regulators to exert 
significant influence over CFPB’s regulations. CFPB may not adopt 
any rule (including any UDAAP rule) unless it has previously 
consulted with federal banking regulators and other appropriate 

109 Id. § 1100G. 
110 See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(striking down SEC’s proxy access rule (Rule 14a-11) because SEC failed 
to comply with its statutory obligation to perform an adequate analysis of 
the potential costs and benefits of the rule, including the rule’s impact on 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).  
111 Dodd-Frank § 1031(c). 
112 Id. § 1031(d). 
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federal agencies about the “consistency” of the proposed rule with 
“prudential, market, or systemic objectives administered by such 
agencies.”113 If any prudential regulator objects in writing to a 
proposed CFPB regulation, CFPB must include in its final 
rulemaking a description of the regulator’s objection and CFPB’s 
response to that objection.114 In addition, any federal agency that is a 
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may 
petition FSOC to veto any regulation issued by CFPB.115 After such a 
petition is filed, FSOC’s chairman (the Treasury Secretary) may stay 
the effectiveness of the challenged CFPB regulation for up to 90 days 
to allow “appropriate consideration of the petition by [FSOC].”116 
FSOC may set aside the challenged CFPB regulation, or any 
provision thereof, if two-thirds of FSOC’s members determine that 
“the regulation or provision would put the safety and soundness of 
the United States banking system or the stability of the financial 
system of the United States at risk.”117 CFPB is the only federal 
financial regulator whose regulations are subject to override by an 
appellate body composed of heads of other agencies.118 FSOC’s 

113 Id. §§ 1022(b)(2)(B), 1031(e).  
114 Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C). 
115 Id. § 1023. FSOC has ten voting members, including the heads of nine 
federal financial agencies – the Treasury Department, CFPB, CFTC, FDIC, 
FHFA, FRB, National Credit Union Administration, OCC and SEC – and an 
independent member with insurance experience. FSOC also includes five 
non-voting members – the Directors of the Federal Insurance Office and the 
Office of Financial Research, as well as three state officials responsible for 
regulating banks, insurance companies and securities firms. Id. § 111(b). 
116 Id. § 1023(c)(1). 
117 Id. § 1023(a), (c)(3). Only an “agency represented by a member of 
[FSOC]” may file a petition to stay or set aside a CFPB regulation. Id. § 
1023(b)(1). It is not entirely clear from the text of section 1023 whether 
members of FSOC that are considered nonvoting members under section 
111 are nevertheless entitled to vote on petitions to set aside CFPB 
regulations under section 1023.  
118 Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th 
Cong. at 8 (2011) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony] (written testimony of 
Prof. Adam J. Levitin), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1980c90b
-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a&Witness_ID=74b14ea1-b0e7-40f5-8d1c-
5de7aea00e5a. 
2011-2012 MISGUIDED QUEST TO UNDERMINE THE CFPB 911 
potential veto provides “an unusually strong check on CFPB 
rulemaking.”119  
As noted above, Title X requires CFPB to consult with 
federal prudential regulators before issuing any regulation.120 
Accordingly, CFPB would have a strong incentive not to “risk a[n] 
FSOC rebuke” by adopting a regulation that had provoked a strong 
objection from another federal regulator during the consultative 
process.121 It appears that CFPB’s supporters included FSOC’s veto 
power in Title X in order to blunt claims by CFPB’s opponents that 
the bureau’s rules could potentially threaten the safety and soundness 
of the banking industry and the stability of the financial system.122  
Title X also subjects CFPB to significant oversight by the 
executive and legislative branches. CFPB must submit semi-annual 
reports to the President and Congress, and CFPB’s Director must 
testify about those reports at semi-annual hearings before the 
responsible congressional committees.123 In addition, CFPB’s 
financial operations are audited each year by the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”), and the audit results are reported to 
Congress.124 None of the other federal bank regulators is subject to 
an annual audit by GAO.125 Thus, while CFPB’s powers are 
undeniably broad, the agency is constrained by significant statutory 
limitations, “includ[ing] some unique requirements that other 
banking regulators do not face. . . .”126  
 
 

119 Id. 
120 See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
121 Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 8. 
122 The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank explained that the FSOC’s 
veto “is designed to ensure that [CFPB’s] consumer protection regulations 
do not put the safety and soundness of the banking system or the stability of 
the financial system at risk.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010). However, 
the report added, “The Committee notes that there was no evidence 
provided during its hearings that consumer protection regulation would put 
safety and soundness at risk. To the contrary, there has been significant 
evidence and extensive testimony that the opposite was the case.” Id. 
123 Dodd-Frank § 1016. 
124 Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 8 (citing Dodd-Frank § 
1017(a)(5)).  
125 Id.; Kate Davidson, Four Big Myths About CFPB and Its Powers, AM. 
BANKER, June 3, 2011, at 1. 
126 Davidson, supra note 125. 
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D. CFPB’s Opponents Are Motivated by the 
Bureau’s Consumer Protection Mission, Not Its 
Structure 
 
As shown above, CFPB’s powers, governance and funding 
are comparable to those of two other federal financial regulators—
OCC and FHFA.127 Yet the financial services industry and its 
legislative allies have strongly championed the single leadership 
governance model and funding arrangements for OCC and FHFA 
while condemning CFPB’s similar features. The marked contrast 
between the financial industry’s attacks on CFPB and its support for 
OCC and FHFA reveal that the industry’s true reason for opposing 
CFPB is its consumer protection mandate, not its structure. 
 OCC is widely viewed as the most committed regulatory 
champion for the interests of major banks.128 All of the largest banks 
operate under national charters, and assessments paid by national 
banks fund virtually all of OCC’s budget. Understandably, given its 
strong budgetary incentives, OCC has competed strenuously with 
FRB, FDIC and state regulators to attract and retain the allegiance of 
large banks.129 During the past three decades, OCC aggressively 

127 See supra notes 82-101͵ and accompanying text (discussing similarities 
among CFPB, OCC and FHFA). 
128 See, e.g., Simon Johnson, When Regulators Side With the Industries They 
Regulate, ECONOMIX  (May 19, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://economix. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/when-regulators-side-with-the-industry-
they-regulate (“Over the last decade, [OCC] repeatedly demonstrated that it 
was very much on the side of banks.”); Stacy Mitchell, Why Republicans 
Hate Warren’s CFPB But Love Another Bank Regulator, HUFFINGTON 
POST, (Mar. 18, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/stacy-
mitchell/why-republicans-hate-warr_b_837539.html (“The difference 
between [CFPB and OCC] is that the OCC sees its mission as protecting, 
not consumers, but big banks. . . . [OCC] has spent much of the last two 
decades preempting state laws that big banks don’t like.”); Joe Nocera, 
Letting the Banks Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A25 (“The 
O.C.C. is a coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it 
oversees. . . . It has consistently defended the Too Big to Fail banks.”); 
Steven Pearlstein, The Big Banks’ Best Friend in Washington, WASH. POST, 
May 27, 2009, at A12 (“[T]he too-big-to-fail crowd has found an 
unapologetic advocate in John Dugan, the comptroller of the currency.”). 
129 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra 
note 10, at 91-95; Levitin, supra note 10, at 152-58; Wilmarth, supra note 
52, at 259-65, 274-79, 296-97. 
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preempted state consumer protection laws and adopted “light touch” 
regulatory policies that helped national banks to build leading 
positions in consumer lending markets for residential mortgages and 
credit cards.130 OCC also issued dozens of rulings that greatly 
expanded the permissible activities of national banks in areas such as 
data processing, derivatives, equipment leasing, insurance sales, real 
estate investments and securities activities.131 During the legislative 
and regulatory deliberations over Dodd-Frank and other responses to 
the financial crisis, OCC strongly opposed a wide variety of reforms, 
including reforms that would (i) allow the states to give greater 
protections to consumers who buy products and services from 
national banks, (ii) provide improved safeguards for credit card 
customers, (iii) require national banks to retain a substantial portion 
of the risk of loans they sell for securitization, and (iv) impose tighter 
restrictions on compensation for bank executives. In each case, OCC 
adopted an anti-reform position that was strongly aligned with major 
banks and their trade associations.132 
Following the enactment of Dodd-Frank, OCC continued to 
support anti-reform sentiments expressed by major banks. For 

130 See authorities cited supra in note 1259; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, 
supra note 10, at 164-73; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 910-19; Wilmarth, 
supra note 52, at 348-56.  
131 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 115-27, 134-36, 153-
58 (discussing OCC rulings related to data processing, equipment leasing, 
insurance sales and securities activities); Michael S. Edwards, OCC 
Interprets The National Bank Act to Permit Banks to Own Hotels and 
Windmills, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 435 (2007) (describing OCC rulings that 
broadened the real estate investment powers of national banks); Saule T. 
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the 
“Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (reviewing OCC 
rulings that expanded permissible derivatives activities for national banks).  
132 See, e.g., Joe Adler, Trade Group Backs Dugan Stand, AM. BANKER, 
Feb. 11, 2010, at 2 (“A securitization trade group . . . applauded recent 
remarks by Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan calling into question 
‘skin-in-the-game’ risk-retention proposals.”); Andrew Martin, Does This 
Bank Watchdog Have a Bite?, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/business/28dugan.html?pagewanted=a
ll (reporting on OCC’s opposition to provisions of Dodd-Frank that would 
increase the applicability of state consumer protection laws to national 
banks); Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Cards and Reluctant Regulators, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/business/ 
17gret.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on OCC’s opposition to stricter 
regulations for credit cards and executive compensation). 
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example, Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh called for 
“modest” increases in capital requirements for systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”), while other federal 
regulators advocated significantly higher capital surcharges for 
SIFIs.133 Mr. Walsh also questioned the desirability of other reforms 
mandated by Dodd-Frank, including the “Volcker rule” that restricts 
bank trading activities.134 In a speech delivered on June 21, 2011, Mr. 
Walsh warned that “in the frenzy of the moment, we can overreact in 
response to crisis. . . . [W]e are in danger of trying to squeeze too 
much risk and complexity out of banking. . . .”135 One news report 
observed that Mr. Walsh “voiced the frustrations of many bankers” 
about Dodd-Frank.136 
Mr. Walsh and OCC created additional controversy by 
issuing regulations that preserved most of the sweeping preemption 

133 Donna Borak, OCC’s Walsh Signals U.S. Split Over SIFI Charge, AM. 
BANKER, June 21, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Walsh and OCC favored a 
“modest” capital surcharge for SIFIs, while other regulators, including 
FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, supported a much higher capital surcharge for 
SIFIs). 
134 Binyamin Appelbaum, Dodd-Frank Backers Clash with Regulator, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2011, at B1 (reporting that, under Mr. Walsh’s direction, 
OCC “is seeking to soften a wide range of [Dodd-Frank’s] provisions, in 
areas ranging from the bread-and-butter of consumer protection to the 
esoteric details of how much money banks can borrow.”); Lindsey White, 
OCC’s Walsh criticizes ‘Volcker rule,’ Basel III capital rules, SNL EUR. 
FIN. DAILY, June 23, 2011 (available on Lexis) (reporting that Mr. Walsh 
“has taken aim at the ‘Volcker rule’ and Basel III capital requirements, 
suggesting that regulators are overreacting to the abuses of the financial 
crisis”); Dave Clarke & Jonathan Spicer, Regulators split on hedging under 
Vocker rule, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/09/21/us-financial-regulation-volcker-
idUSTRE78K42R20110921 (reporting that OCC “has pushed to give banks 
more leeway” in their trading operations by championing a broader 
interpretation of permissible hedging activities under Dodd-Frank’s 
“Volcker rule,” while FDIC, CFTC and SEC “have advocated for a tighter 
interpretation of the law”). For a discussion of debates over the enactment 
and implementation of the Volcker rule, see Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem, supra note 57, at 1025-30. 
135 John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the 
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (June 21, 2011), at 3, available 
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2011/pub-speech-
2011-78.pdf. 
136 Appelbaum, supra note 134. 
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rules that OCC had issued in 2004.137 National banks and their trade 
associations warmly endorsed the OCC’s revised preemption 
regulations.138 However, the OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking 
for those regulations provoked an unusual public rebuke from 
Treasury Department General Counsel George Madison. Mr. 
Madison criticized OCC’s proposed regulations for (i) adopting a 
preemption standard that was more favorable to national banks than 
the standard mandated by Dodd-Frank, and (ii) advocating the 
retention of most of the OCC’s 2004 blanket preemption rules.139 
Democratic members of Congress strongly criticized Mr. Walsh, and 
President Obama nominated Thomas Curry, a member of FDIC’s 

137 For discussions of OCC’s issuance of revised regulations that preserved 
most of the broad-scale preemption rules that OCC adopted in 2004, see 
Rob Blackwell, “New” OCC Standard Feels Very Familiar, AM. BANKER, 
May 16, 2011, at 1; R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: Experts Debate Impact 
on OCC Powers If Preemption Proposal Is Pushed Back, 97 BNA’S 
BANKING REP. 57 (July 12, 2011); R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: OCC 
Finalizes Preemption Rule But Leaves Room for Backtracking, 97 BNA’S 
BANKING REP. 157 (July 26, 2011) [hereinafter Bruce, “OCC Preemption 
Rule”]. The OCC’s revised preemption regulations are published at Office 
of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43549 (July 21, 2011).  
138 See Blackwell, supra note 137 (reporting that “banking industry 
representatives,” including the Financial Services Roundtable, endorsed the 
OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking); Bruce, “OCC Preemption Rule,” 
supra note 137 (reporting that “[n]ational banks cheered the [OCC’s final] 
rules,” as did the American Bankers Association); Louise Story, Dodd-
Frank Rekindles Old Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, at B1 (reporting 
that Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and the Clearing House 
Association supported OCC’s proposed rules). 
139 Kate Davidson, Treasury Sharply Criticizes OCC’s Preemption 
Proposal, AM. BANKER, June 29, 2011, at 1; see also Binyamin Appelbaum, 
Official from F.D.I.C. Picked to Lead Banking Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, July 
2, 2011, at B3 (reporting that “the Treasury Department took the 
unprecedented step of submitting a public comment to the [OCC] criticizing 
its [preemption] proposal for ignoring [Dodd-Frank’s] intent”). I have 
previously argued that Dodd-Frank requires OCC to rescind all of its 2004 
blanket preemption rules. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 926-41; Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., VIEWPOINT: OCC’s Walsh Gets It Wrong on Preemption, 
AM. BANKER, May 19, 2011, at 9; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., OCC Gets It 
Wrong on Preemption, Again, AM. BANKER, July 29, 2011, at 8.  
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Board of Directors, to become Comptroller of the Currency in place 
of Mr. Walsh.140 
Republican members of Congress expressed great concern 
that the Treasury Department’s public criticism of the OCC’s 
preemption proposal might undermine the OCC’s policymaking 
independence. As noted above, OCC’s autonomy is protected against 
interference by the Treasury Department in the same way that 
CFPB’s independence is shielded against infringement by the 
FRB.141 In July 2011, Representative Randy Neugebauer (R-TX) 
launched an investigation of the Treasury Department’s decision to 
submit a public comment letter criticizing the OCC’s preemption 
proposal.142 He declared that the comment letter “prompted concerns 
regarding the Treasury Department’s influence on OCC rulemaking,” 
and he requested “assurances that the Treasury has permitted the 
OCC to act independently in the rulemaking for this and all 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.”143 A few weeks later, Senator 
Shelby expressed similar concerns about Treasury’s comment letter 
during the Senate Banking Committee’s hearing on Mr. Curry’s 
nomination for appointment as Comptroller.144  
As a matter of principle, the emphatic defense of OCC’s 
autonomy by Representative Neugebauer and Senator Shelby seems 
at odds with their insistence on stringent external controls over 
CFPB’s budget and rulemaking.145 Their diametrically opposed 

140 Appelbaum, supra note 134; Appelbaum, supra note 139; Meera Louis, 
Dodd-Frank May Be Subject of Confirmation Hearing for U.S. Bank 
Regulators, BLOOMBERG, July 26, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-07-26/fdic-occ-nominees-to-face-dodd-frank-queries-from-
senate-panel.html; Kevin Wack, Curry Answers Preemption Questions, AM. 
BANKER, July 27, 2011, at 3.  
141 See supra notes 77-78, 87 and accompanying text. 
142 R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: Neugebauer Seeks Records from 
Treasury, Cites Worries About Interference with OCC, 97 BNA’S BANKING 
REP. 67 (July 12, 2011). 
143 Id. (quoting letter from Rep. Neugebauer to Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner). 
144 Wack, supra note 140. 
145 See Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Neugebauer Bill Would Allow 
Congress to Control Purse Strings of Consumer Agency, 96 BNA’S 
BANKING REPORT 285 (Feb. 15, 2011) (describing Representative 
Neugebauer’s demands for congressional control over CFPB’s budget); Phil 
Mattingly & Carter Dougherty, U.S. Consumer Bureau Funding Would 
Drop 40 Percent Under Republican Plan, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2011, 5:16 
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attitudes toward OCC and CFPB indicate that Republican leaders are 
“less concerned about the structural independence of federal financial 
regulatory agencies and . . . more concerned about whether those 
agencies issue regulations that support the interests of our largest 
financial institutions.”146 
One finds the same incongruity in the decade-long campaign 
by major banks and their legislative allies to create a strong 
independent regulator for Fannie and Freddie. That campaign 
culminated in Congress’ passage of a statute establishing FHFA in 
2008.147 From 1999 to 2008, a coalition of large lenders and their 
trade associations (known first as “FM Watch” and later as “FM 
Policy Focus”) lobbied for legislation to rein in Fannie and Freddie. 
That coalition—which included the Financial Services Roundtable, 
the Consumer Bankers Association, Bank of America, JP Morgan 
Chase and Wells Fargo—raised a number of valid points, such as the 
systemic risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, their implicit 
government subsidies, their inadequate capital, and the weak 
supervisory powers granted to their existing regulator, the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”). However, 
coalition members also had a clear self-interest—namely, to remove 
or weaken Fannie and Freddie as competitors in markets for 
originating and securitizing residential mortgages. The lobbyists and 

PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-15/house-republicans-
target-consumer-protection-bureau-funding-in-budget-bill.html (“Neuge-
bauer . . . has introduced legislation that would move the CFPB into the 
Treasury Department from the Fed, a step that would make it subject to the 
congressional appropriations process.”) ; U.S. Fed. News, Rep., Neugebauer 
Issues Statement on Bringing Oversight and Accountability to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Board [sic], (Feb. 10, 2011) (available on Lexis) 
(“Given the significant and perhaps over-regulating powers the CFPB has 
been given by the Obama Administration, Congress must have a say on the 
appropriation of taxpayer money funding this agency's operation.”); Shelby, 
supra note 37, at 1 (explaining in a Wall Street Journal op-ed why Congress 
should have extensive oversight powers with respect to CFPB).  
146 Bruce, “OCC Preemption Rule,” supra note 137, at 57-58 (quoting my 
comments); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 145, at 2 (quoting 
Rep. Brad Miller, D-NC, who maintained that “[t]he financial industry 
always hated [CFPB] . . . [a]nd in my experience in Congress, what the 
financial industry wants, Republicans are usually perfectly willing to do”). 
147 Kate Davidson, Question of Hypocrisy in GOP Assault on the CFPB, 
176 AM. BANKER 43, Mar. 21, 2011, at 1. 
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legislative allies for FM Watch and FM Policy Focus were mainly 
Republicans.148 
As noted above, FHFA is similar to CFPB because it has a 
single-Director governance model and does not depend on 
congressional appropriations for its funding.149 Major banks and their 
congressional allies helped to pass legislation ensuring that FHFA 
would be “a strong, independent regulator” with a secure funding 
source, thereby protecting FHFA against the threat of capture by 
Fannie and Freddie.150 The obvious inconsistency between the 

148 For descriptions of the lobbying campaign by FM Watch and FM Policy 
Focus, see Charles R. Babcock, Mortgage Giants Stir Congress, WASH. 
POST, June 11, 2003, at E01 (“Rival banking and insurance companies have 
focused more on what they consider the companies' unfair advantage in 
cheaper financing stemming from their government ties.”); Jeffrey H. 
Birnbaum, Editorial, The Man Behind the Byline Isn’t Behind the Article. 
So, Who Is?, WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at A15 (“[T]he wide-ranging 
housing rescue bill was a victory for a coalition of banks and mortgage 
insurers that has been fighting for nearly a decade to rein in the mortgage 
finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”); Stephanie Fitch & Erin 
Killian, Freddie’s Enemies, FORBES, July 7, 2003, at 50 (“FM Watch . . . 
[was] [f]ounded in 1999 with the idea of keeping Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae honest.”); Ed Roberts, Competitors Want Fannie, Freddie Out of Their 
Business, 7 CREDIT UNION J. 24, June 16, 2003, at 1 (“FM Watch has been 
lobbying Congress for the past few years to rein in the so-called mission 
creep of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae . . .”); Opponents Reload for Fight 
with the GSEs, 8 CREDIT UNION J. 50, Dec. 13, 2004, at 12 (explaining how 
FM Watch hired new lobbyists to strengthen its fight for stronger regulation 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Jeanne Cummings, Regulation comes to 
those who wait, POLITICO.COM (July 9, 2007, 7:41 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0707/4835.html (“For nearly eight 
years, the organization of bankers, consumer advocates and financial houses 
has been pushing for greater scrutiny of mortgage lending giants Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.”). 
149 See supra notes 79-81, 92-93 and accompanying text (explaining that 
CFPB’s financial autonomy is not as extensive as FHFA’s budgetary 
independence, because CFPB is assured of receiving approximately $500 
million of funding from FRB but would be required to request a 
congressional appropriation in order to obtain supplemental funding).  
150 H.R. REP. NO. 110-142, at 87 (2007); see also Davidson, supra note 147, 
at 1 (“[Barney] Frank said, ‘I think you've seen that with my Republican 
colleagues: many of them liked OFHEO, so they wanted it insulated, and 
they don't like CFPB, so they want to subject it to further controls.’”); supra 
note 148, infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (explaining that a top 
priority of FHFA’s supporters was to insulate FHFA from political capture 
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banking industry’s support for FHFA and its vehement opposition to 
CFPB provides further evidence that attacks on CFPB’s structure 
“are not born from a matter of principle, but just because [opponents] 
don’t like the CFPB.”151  
 
IV. The Changes to CFPB Demanded by the Financial 
Services Industry and Its Legislative Allies Would Seriously 
Impair CFPB’s Independence and Effectiveness 
  
As described above, the financial services industry has 
enthusiastically supported demands by Republican congressional 
leaders for fundamental changes in CFPB’s governance, powers and 
funding. Republican-backed legislation would establish a 
multimember board to govern CFPB, would increase the ability of 
prudential regulators to veto CFPB’s rules on “safety and soundness” 
grounds, and would require CFPB to obtain its funding through 
congressional appropriations.152 As shown below, each of those 
modifications would significantly impair CFPB’s ability to fulfill its 
statutory mission.   
 
A. CFPB’s Director Should Not Be Replaced by a 
Multimember Commission 
 
House Republicans passed legislation on July 21, 2011, that 
would create a five-member commission to administer CFPB in 
place of a single Director.153 As Adam Levitin has observed, “[t]he 
scholarly literature on agency design has not achieved any 
consensus” as to whether single agency heads are superior or inferior 
to multimember commissions.154 Administrative law scholars have 
generally described the two agency structures as offering relatively 
equal “trade-offs” between (1) greater “efficiency and 
accountability” within agencies administered by single officials and 
(2) increased “deliberation and debate” and “compromise” within 

by giving FHFA a secure funding source that would not be subject to 
congressional control).   
151 Davidson, supra note 147, at 1 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank). 
152 See supra notes 310-35 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing House passage 
of H.R. 1315). 
154 Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 9. 
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multimember commissions.155 In contrast, a 1987 evaluation of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) by the General 
Accounting Office (“GAO”) concluded that the superior 
administrative effectiveness of a single-director structure would 
outweigh any potential benefits of collegial decision-making within 
CPSC’s multimember commission.156 
CPSC was “the inspiration” for CFPB’s creation.157 When 
Congress enacted legislation establishing CPSC in 1972, the 
agency’s proponents sought to create a powerful agency with a broad 
mandate to protect consumers from dangerous products.158 Consumer 
groups also supported the creation of a five-member commission for 
CPSC as a means of promoting wider expertise and political 
independence.159 However, CPSC is now “widely regarded as one of 
the least politically independent and influential agencies in 
government.”160  
Commentators have identified several reasons for CPSC’s 
lackluster record in protecting consumers, including its lack of a 
secure funding source.161 GAO concluded in 1987 that CPSC’s 

155 Barkow, supra note 7, at 37-38; see also Levitin Testimony, supra note 
118, at 9.  
156 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HRD-87-14, TESTIMONY: 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION 2-6 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 GAO-CPSC Report] (explaining 
that some CPSC officials supported the agency’s multimember commission 
structure because it encouraged an “exchange of ideas, and a mix of 
perspectives . . . including diversity of background, areas of expertise, and 
political considerations . . .” while others criticized CPSC’s commission 
structure for creating serious administrative problems; based on GAO's 
review of “[a] number of studies, such as those by the Hoover Commission 
and the Ash Council . . . over the past 50 years on regulatory commissions,” 
GAO determined that “[a]ll of the studies we reviewed found some 
significant problems with the commission structure” and some studies 
“recommended replacing the multimember commissions with agencies 
headed by single administrators.”); see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 65-72 
(describing CPSC's administrative shortcomings).  
157 Barkow, supra note 7, at 72. 
158 Id. at 65. 
159 Id. at 66. 
160 Id. at 71 (noting that “[i]n its first five years, CPSC issued only one 
safety standard . . . and only seven safety standards after ten years”). 
161 Id. at 67-71 (citing studies documenting CPSC’s lack of effectiveness 
and explaining that “[t]he major reason [for CPSC’s ineffectiveness] is that 
the CPSC has been chronically underfunded and understaffed”); see also 
2011-2012 MISGUIDED QUEST TO UNDERMINE THE CFPB 921 
multimember commission structure was ineffective and should be 
scrapped in favor of a single director.162 GAO found that CPSC’s 
leadership lacked stability and direction due to “high turnover” in the 
commission’s membership, squabbles among commissioners over 
resources, and delays in decision-making.163 GAO reported that 
“[s]even of the eight other health and safety regulatory agencies . . . 
have single administrators,” and the unified leadership structure of 
those agencies appeared to “enhance the decision-making 
process.”164 However, Congress did not adopt GAO’s 
recommendation to replace CPSC’s multimember commission with a 
single administrator.165 
Thus, the factors of efficiency, stability, decisiveness and 
accountability argue in favor of retaining CFPB’s single-Director 
model of governance. Creating a five-member commission would 
likely produce more delay and less consistency in CFPB’s decision-
making. Moreover, a five-member commission would expose CFPB 
to the risk of leadership deadlock whenever a commissioner left 
office.166 This threat of institutional paralysis would be heightened 
if—as provided in the recently passed House bill—no more than 
three members of the commission could be affiliated with the same 
political party.167 Under that structure, the departure of any member 

infra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing CPSC’s vulnerability to 
political influence due to its reliance on congressional appropriations for 
funding). 
162 1987 GAO-CPSC Report, supra note 156, at 1. 
163 Id. at 2. 
164 Id. at 5 
165 Id. at 6; see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 71 & n.319 (explaining the 
GAO’s single administrator recommendation and Congress’s decision to not 
change the CFPC structure). 
166 In contrast, CFPB’s Deputy Director (when appointed by the Director) 
would have authority to “serve as acting Director in the absence or 
unavailability of the Director.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(5).  
167 Ferullo, supra note 30 (describing H.R. 1315 as passed by the House of 
Representatives on July 21, 2011 which would result in “five 
commissioners . . . with no more than three of them allowed to be members 
of the same political party.”); Carter Dougherty & Phil Mattingly, Warren 
Says Proposed Consumer Bureau Changes Would Aid Banks, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 8, 2011, 6:53 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
08/warren-says-proposed-consumer-bureau-changes-would-benefit-
banks.html (discussing the proposal by House Republicans “to replace the 
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of the majority would likely produce a commission that was evenly 
divided on a wide range of policy issues. During the past three 
decades, the lengthy vetting process for Presidential nominees and 
prolonged Senate confirmation battles have frequently resulted in 
persistent vacancies and policy deadlocks at agencies with 
multimember commissions.168  
The financial services industry and House Republican 
leaders appear to recognize the potential shortcomings of 
multimember commissions, at least for the financial regulatory 
agencies they support. The industry and its legislative allies have not 
attempted to establish multimember commissions to replace the 
single-administrator governance structures at OCC and FHFA. 
Indeed, the Republican leadership summarily rejected such a 
proposal during a recent House subcommittee vote on legislation to 
change CFPB’s structure. Representative Brad Miller (D-NC) 
introduced an amendment that would have authorized a multimember 
commission for OCC as well as CFPB, but his amendment was ruled 
“not germane” and out of order by Representative Shelley Moore 
Capito (R-WV), the subcommittee’s chair.169 It is not intuitively 
obvious why Representative Miller’s OCC amendment was “not 

CFPB director position created by the Dodd-Frank Act with a five-person 
commission”). 
168 See Robert Douglas Brownstone, The National Labor Relations Board at 
50: Politicization Creates Crisis, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 268-69 & 269 
n.188 (1986) (reporting that, during 1983-84, “more than 20 decisions were 
stalled because they were deadlocked at 2-2 and the [National Labor 
Relations] Board did not have a fifth member”); Carol Skrzycki, Top 
Regulatory Posts Remain Unfilled: Dozens of Federal Jobs Are Vacant as 
Politics Bog Down Appointment Process, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 
A01 (reporting that 46 positions were vacant on “boards and commissions 
of independent regulatory agencies that require Senate confirmation,” 
resulting in policy deadlocks at some agencies); John M. Broder, Tie Vote 
Blocks F.C.C. Inquiry On Liquor Ads, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at A20 
(reporting that a vacancy on the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) produced a 2-2 vote that prevented the FCC from proceeding with 
an investigation of liquor advertising); see also FTC Still Split On 
Microsoft: No Antitrust Ruling Issued, But Firm Says Probe Is Continuing, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 1993, at A1 (reporting that recusal 
of a commissioner produced a 2-2 vote that prevented the FTC from issuing 
an antitrust complaint against Microsoft). 
169 Kate Davidson, Subcommittee Approves Bills to Revamp CFPB, 176 AM. 
BANKER 70, May 5, 2011, at 3.  
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germane” if Republicans were truly seeking to establish an important 
principle of administrative law by changing CFPB’s governance 
structure to a multimember commission.  
As noted above, a leading argument in favor of the 
multimember commission governance structure is that it encourages 
the agency to consider views from persons with a variety of 
backgrounds and perspectives.170 However, Dodd-Frank already 
requires CFPB’s Director to consult with a wide range of outside 
parties before making major policy decisions. First, the Director must 
seek advice from CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board, whose 
members will represent many different perspectives and 
backgrounds.171 Second, CFPB must consult with other federal 
financial regulators before adopting any regulation, and CFPB must 
address any objections raised by those regulators in its notice of final 
rulemaking.172 In particular, CFPB must take into account the 
“consistency” of each proposed regulation with “prudential, market, 
or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”173 Third, 
CFPB must seek the advice of its small business advisory panel 
regarding the impact of any proposed regulation on the cost of credit 
for small businesses,174 and CFPB must also consider the effects of 
each proposed rule on consumers (especially those in rural areas) and 

170 See supra note 1556 (describing arguments made by some CPSC 
officials in favor of a multimember commission). 
171 Dodd-Frank § 1014(a) (requiring CFPB’s Director to establish a 
Consumer Advisory Board that will meet at least twice each year. The 
purpose of that Board is “to advise and consult with [CFPB] in the exercise 
of its functions under the Federal consumer financial laws, and to provide 
information on emerging practices in the consumer financial products or 
services industry”); Dodd-Frank § 1014(b) (instructing CFPB's Director, in 
selecting the Board's members, to “seek to assemble experts in consumer 
protection, financial services, community development, fair lending and 
civil rights, and consumer financial products or services,” as well as 
representatives of depository institutions that provide services to 
underserved communities and communities affected by high-cost 
mortgages). 
172 See supra notes 113-12014 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s 
obligation to consult with other regulators under Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b)(2), 
1031(e)). 
173 Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(B). 
174 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s duty to 
seek the recommendations of its small business advisory panel under Dodd-
Frank § 1100G(b)). 
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smaller depository institutions.175 Thus, CFPB’s Director is already 
obliged to consider the views of many interested parties before 
deciding to adopt a regulation. Superimposing a multimember 
commission on top of CFPB’s existing decision-making process 
would provide few, if any, benefits, and it would impose potentially 
significant costs on the bureau and the public.  
 
B. The Financial Stability Oversight Council Should 
Not Be Given an Enhanced Veto Power over 
CFPB’s Regulations 
 
1. The House Legislation Would Enable 
Prudential Regulators to Block CFPB’s 
Regulations by Invoking “Safety and 
Soundness” Concerns Affecting 
Individual Banks  
 
The Republican-sponsored House bill would greatly 
strengthen FSOC’s ability to veto regulations issued by CFPB.176 
Currently, under Dodd-Frank, any agency represented on FSOC may 
file a petition to set aside a CFPB regulation, and the Treasury 
Secretary may stay the rule’s effectiveness for up to 90 days to 
facilitate FSOC’s consideration of the petition.177 Dodd-Frank 
authorizes FSOC’s members, by a two-thirds vote, to strike down a 
CFPB regulation if they determine that the rule “would put the safety 
and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of 
the financial system of the United States at risk.”178  

175 See supra notes 11007-1120 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s 
obligation to perform a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed rule). 
176 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing passage of 
H.R. 1315 by the House on July 21, 2011). 
177 Dodd-Frank § 1023(b)(1)(A), (c) (requiring an agency, before filing a 
petition to set aside a regulation issued by CFPB, to attempt “in good faith” 
to work with CFPB in resolving the agency’s concerns about the 
regulation’s impact on the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system 
or the stability of the U.S. financial system).  
178 Id. at § 1023(a); see supra notes 115-1167 and accompanying text 
(discussing FSOC’s authority to veto a CFPB regulation). As discussed 
above, there are ten voting members and five nonvoting members of FSOC. 
It is not entirely clear from the text of Section 1023 whether FSOC’s 
nonvoting members can vote on whether to set aside a CFPB regulation.  
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In contrast, under the House bill, a simple majority of 
FSOC’s members could vote to invalidate a CFPB regulation if they 
determine that the rule would be inconsistent with the safe and sound 
operations of U.S. financial institutions.179 Thus, the House bill 
would remove Dodd-Frank’s requirement that a CFPB regulation 
must have systemic adverse effects (as opposed to a negative impact 
on individual institutions) in order to justify FSOC’s veto. The House 
bill would also (i) bar CFPB’s Director from voting on any petition 
to set aside a CFPB regulation, and (ii) delete Dodd-Frank’s 
requirement that FSOC must act expeditiously on any such 
petition.180  
Hence, the House bill would enable federal prudential 
regulators to veto CFPB’s regulations by claiming that the 
challenged rules would impair the “safety and soundness” of 
individual financial institutions. The House bill would also permit 
the Treasury Secretary to approve indefinite suspensions of CFPB 
rules while FSOC considers veto petitions. As a practical matter, 
federal prudential regulators would be able to block any CFPB rule if 
they believed that the rule would have an adverse impact on one or 
more financial institutions that were subjects of regulatory concern. 
As shown below, prudential regulators would be likely to exercise 
their veto power to protect the interests of their largest regulated 
constituents.  
 

179 Bivins, supra note 31. 
180 Id.; Dodd-Frank § 1023(c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(B) (requiring FSOC to act on an 
agency’s petition to set aside a CFPB rule within 45 days after the petition is 
filed, or within 90 days of that date if the Treasury Secretary has agreed to 
stay the rule’s effectiveness). 
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2. Prudential Regulators Failed to Protect 
Consumers or to Ensure the Safety and 
Soundness of Financial Institutions 
during the Credit Boom that Led to the 
Current Financial Crisis 
 
The House bill is based on the unwarranted assumption that 
protecting consumers frequently injures the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions. While individual institutions may complain 
about particular consumer laws, the current financial crisis has 
demonstrated that appropriate consumer protection is essential to 
maintain the long-term safety and soundness of our financial 
system.181 As the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank pointed 
out, “[t]here was no evidence provided during [the committee’s] 
hearings that consumer protection regulation would put safety and 
soundness [of banks] at risk. To the contrary, there has been 
significant evidence and extensive testimony that the opposite was 
the case.”182  
The Senate committee report also explained that “the failure 
of the federal banking and other regulators to address significant 
consumer protection issues” during the subprime lending boom 
proved to be “detrimental to both consumers and the safety and 
soundness of the banking system.”183 The history of the financial 
crisis strongly supports the Senate committee’s view. As I have 
described in previous articles, federal regulators allowed large 
complex financial institutions (“LCFIs”) to become “the primary 
private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the 

181 See Levitin, supra note 10, at 152 (“The events of 2007-2008 have also 
shown that . . . [c]onsumer protection must be seen as an essential 
component of systemic-risk protection. The failure to protect consumers has 
systemic externalities.”); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: 
Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 62 (2005) ( “[A] bank that is involved in predatory 
lending practices not only harms consumers by charging undisclosed fees, 
but also may threaten the bank’s financial condition by systematically 
making overly risky loans.”).  
182 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010) (quoting the views of two senior 
former bank regulators – Kevin Jacques and Brad Sabel – who denied the 
existence of any conflict between consumer protection and safety and 
soundness regulation). 
183 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9. 
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subprime financial crisis,” and LCFIs became “the epicenter of the 
current global financial mess.”184  
LCFIs provided most of the funding, directly or indirectly, 
for “almost 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans between 
2003 and 2007, and by 2008 about $2 trillion of such loans were 
outstanding.”185 LCFIs securitized most of those nonprime loans, and 
securitization encouraged a steady decline in lending standards 
between 2003 and 2006.186 LCFIs believed—mistakenly—that they 
could successfully transfer the risks of nonprime loans by bundling 
the loans into mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and selling the 
MBS to far-flung investors. LCFIs had powerful incentives to 
originate (or buy) and securitize nonprime loans because they earned 
large fees from securitizing the loans and selling the MBS.187  
Thus, LCFIs financed a huge surge in nonprime lending that 
helped to generate a massive boom-and-bust cycle in the U.S. 
housing market.188 “Housing prices rose rapidly from 2001 to 2005, 
stopped rising in 2006, and began to fall sharply in 2007.”189 As I 
have previously explained, LCFIs played a central role in this 
disastrous credit cycle: 
 
[B]y 2007, the health of the U.S. economy relied on 
a massive confidence game—indeed, some might 

184 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 963, 1046 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal 
Banking], quoted in Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 
977; see also Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 897-903, 910-19 (describing 
regulatory actions that contributed to the failures or government bailouts of 
several leading LCFIs). 
185 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 897; Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal 
Banking, supra note 184, at 1011-12, 1015-20, 1022-24 (showing that (i) 
LCFIs were the primary sources of funding, directly or indirectly, for most 
nonprime mortgages, (ii) about $3.7 trillion of subprime and Alt-A 
mortgages were originated between 2001 and 2006, and (iii) more than half 
of the nonprime loans originated between 2003 and 2007 were used to 
refinance existing loans). 
186 Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 1020-
27; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 963-67. 
187 Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 995, 
1025-26; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 971-72. 
188 Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem supra note 57, at 963-66, 970-71. 
189 Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 1024. 
928 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31 

say, a Ponzi scheme—operated by its leading 
financial institutions. This confidence game, which 
sustained the credit boom, could continue only as 
long as investors were willing to keep buying new 
debt instruments [underwritten by LCFIs] that would 
enable overstretched borrowers to expand their 
consumption and service their debts. In the summer 
of 2007, when investors lost confidence in the ability 
of subprime borrowers to meet their obligations, the 
game collapsed and a severe financial crisis began.190 
 
The rapid decline in home prices after 2006 triggered an 
abrupt shutdown in nonprime lending and cut off refinancing options 
for many borrowers.191 Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages in 
rapidly increasing numbers, which led to widespread foreclosures. 
Lenders foreclosed on five million homes by the end of 2010, and 4 
million additional foreclosures are expected to occur in 2011 and 
2012.192  
Accelerating defaults on home mortgages inflicted major 
losses on holders of MBS and other mortgage-related investments. 
Cascading losses on mortgage-related investments triggered a flight 
by investors from risky assets of all kinds, and that “flight to safety” 
unleashed a systemic financial crisis.193 The financial crisis caused 

190 Id. at 1008. 
191 Id. at 1019-20, 1024. 
192 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898; see also Nick Timiraos, Home Forecast 
Calls for Pain, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, at A1 (reporting that “[o]ne in 
five Americans with a mortgage owes more than their home is worth, and 
$7 trillion of homeowners’ equity has been lost in the [housing] bust”). 
193 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the 
Run on the Repo 6-21 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 09-14, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752 (providing data confirming 
that the repo market dried up quickly once losses on MBS became 
apparent); Arvind Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned 
in the Crisis, 24 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (2010) (“[losses on MBS] 
caused debt markets to break down; indeed, fundamental values and market 
values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far 
removed from the ‘toxic’ subprime mortgage assets at the root of the 
crisis.”); Lasse Heje Pedersen, When Everyone Runs for the Exit, 5 INT’L. J. 
ON CENT. BANKING 177, 177-81 (2009) (explaining how investors “ran for 
the exits” after recognizing the risks inherent in mortgage-related 
investments). 
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the failures or near-failures of many LCFIs and inflicted severe 
distress on the U.S. economy.194 To prevent the onset of a second 
Great Depression, the U.S. government spent $800 billion on 
economic stimulus and provided more than $6 trillion of assistance 
to financial institutions in the form of central bank loans and other 
government extensions of credit, guarantees, asset purchases and 
capital infusions.195 Notwithstanding these extraordinary measures, 
the U.S. economy is still struggling to escape a prolonged period of 
slow growth and high unemployment.196  
By giving prudential regulators an enhanced veto over 
CFPB’s regulations, the House bill would effectively put 
responsibility for consumer protection back in the hands of the same 
agencies that failed to protect both consumers and our financial 
markets during the past decade.197 The Senate committee report on 
Dodd-Frank pointed out “the spectacular failure of the prudential 
regulators” to protect consumers from predatory nonprime 
mortgages.198 As the report explained, regulators failed to crack 
down on mortgages with “exploding” adjustable rates and other 
abusive features.199 Instead, “regulators ‘routinely sacrificed 
consumer protection for short-term profitability of banks’ . . . and 
Wall Street investment firms, despite the fact that so many people 
were raising the alarm about the problems these loans would 
cause.”200 Moreover, OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory 
lending laws and state enforcement efforts and thereby “actively 

194 Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 1027-
35, 1044-46; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 957-61, 
977-81. 
195 Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 957-59. 
196 Id. at 959-61; Kevin J. Lansing, Gauging the Impact of the Great 
Recession, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2011-21 (July 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2011/el2011-21.html; 
Neil Irwin, Flat job figures stoke fears of stalled recovery, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 3, 2011, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. economy was continuing to 
grow slowly and was hindered by high unemployment).  
197 See Bivins, supra note 31 (“It makes no sense to give the same banking 
regulators who were asleep at the wheel before the last financial crisis more 
power to second guess the CFPB.”) (quoting Pamela Banks, senior policy 
counsel for Consumers Union); Davidson & Adler, supra note 30 (quoting a 
similar comment by Rep. Barney Frank). 
198 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15 (2010). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. (quoting testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009). 
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created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could 
flourish without state controls.”201  
Numerous studies have confirmed the Senate committee 
report’s findings concerning the shortcomings of federal prudential 
regulators.202 For example, FRB had authority under a 1994 federal 
statute to adopt rules to prohibit unfair or deceptive lending practices 
by all types of mortgage lenders.203 However, notwithstanding 
proposals for action by FRB staff members and many others, FRB 
failed to promulgate effective regulations until 2008, a year after the 
subprime mortgage market collapsed.204 Similarly, FRB declined to 
exercise its authority to regulate high-risk mortgage lending by 
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies until 2007, again 
despite calls for action by FRB staff members and others.205  

201 Id. at 16-17. 
202 See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-205 (describing 
regulatory failures by FRB, OCC and OTS); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 
10, at 120-32, 141-44 (discussing the shortcomings of federal prudential 
regulators); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 10, at 81-95 (same); Levitin, 
supra note 10, at 151-69 (explaining the “failure of the current consumer-
protection regime in financial services,” id. at 151); Wilmarth, supra note 
10, at 897-919 (“Regulatory inaction and preemption by federal banking 
agencies played a significant role in allowing abusive nonprime lending to 
grow and spread during the past decade,” id. at 897). 
203 See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898-99 (discussing FRB’s authority to 
prohibit unfair or deceptive mortgage lending practices under the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act). 
204 Id. at 899-900; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 195-96 
(“When HOEPA passed, Congress instructed the Fed to implement the 
[prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts and practices in mortgage 
lending], but Alan Greenspan was dead set against obeying that 
Congressional mandate so long as he was chairman.”); JOHNSON & KWAK, 
supra note 10, at 141-42 (describing the FRB’s failure to enforce HOEPA 
because of Greenspan’s opposition); Sudeep Reddy, “Currents: Fed Faces 
Grilling on Consumer-Protection Lapses,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2009, at 
A22 (same). 
205 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 900-01; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 10, at 198-203 (describing the FRB’s failure to regulate mortgage 
lending by nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, due to Alan 
Greenspan’s belief that such regulation would be counterproductive; 
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 142-43 (same); Binyamin Appelbaum, 
As Subprime Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (same).  
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When indisputable evidence of the risks of subprime and 
Alt-A loans emerged in 2005, FRB, FDIC, OCC and OTS responded 
not with binding rules, but instead with weak “guidance” that urged 
banks to follow prudent lending policies. The agencies’ guidance 
encouraged—but did not require—banks to verify each borrower’s 
ability to pay the fully-amortized rate on adjustable-rate mortgages. 
Federal regulators did not take meaningful steps to ensure 
compliance with their guidance until after the subprime crisis broke 
out.206  
In the absence of effective federal regulation, more than 
thirty states passed laws to restrain predatory lending practices. 
However, OCC and OTS quickly issued a series of preemptive 
rulings that blocked the states from applying those laws to national 
banks, federal thrifts and their subsidiaries.207 In combination, federal 
regulatory inaction and federal preemption helped LCFIs that 
controlled national banks and federal thrifts to capture the lion’s 
share of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending markets during 
the peak of the housing boom between 2005 and 2007.208 Several of 

206 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 901-03, 907-08; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, 
supra note 10, at 165-66, 168, 174, 176 (discussing the reliance of federal 
regulators on weak, nonbinding guidance even after they became aware of 
significant and growing problems with risky nonprime lending); JOHNSON 
& KWAK, supra note 10, at 143 (same). 
207 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 909-15; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 10, at 157-62 (describing the adverse effects of OCC and OTS rules 
that preempted state consumer protection laws); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra 
note 10, at 143-44 (same); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us: 
The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Crisis Coming – and How They 
Were Thwarted by the Banks and Washington, BUS. WK., Oct. 20, 2008, at 
36 (same). 
208 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 916-19; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 10, at 169-71, 176-81, 198-206 (explaining how OCC and OTS 
preemption helped large national banks and federal thrifts to become 
leading nonprime lenders); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 120-44 
(same). Twelve of the fifteen largest subprime lenders in 2006 were subject 
to regulation by federal banking agencies, and those twelve lenders 
“controlled 50 percent of the subprime market.” ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 10, at 204; see also id. at 205 tbl. 10.1 (showing that OTS had 
jurisdiction over five of the top 15 subprime lenders in 2006, while FDIC 
had authority over one, FRB over three, and OCC over three).  
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those federally-supervised LCFIs subsequently failed or required 
federal assistance to avoid failure.209  
 
3. Four Factors Contributed to the 
Regulatory Failures That Occurred 
during the Subprime Lending Boom 
 
Why didn’t federal regulators stop financial institutions from 
generating huge volumes of high-risk credit that exploited 
consumers, risked their own soundness and undermined the stability 
of the financial markets? At least four factors contributed to this 
systemic failure of regulation. First, during the credit boom banking 
agencies focused on near-term profitability as a key indicator of the 
“safety and soundness” of financial institutions. Federal regulators 
therefore resisted proposals by consumer groups for tougher federal 
lending rules, and OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory 
lending laws that threatened to reduce bank profits from originating 
and securitizing nonprime loans.210 Banking agencies also declined to 
take tough enforcement actions to stop speculative lending and 
capital markets activities as long as banks continued to report large 
profits, despite misgivings among some regulators about the potential 
long-term risks of those activities.211 
Second, regulators competed—both within and across 
national borders—to attract the allegiance of major financial 
institutions. Regulatory competition encouraged agencies to follow 
polices that would please their existing regulated constituents and 
attract new ones. For example, OCC and OTS issued their 

209 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 918-19 (citing failures of Washington 
Mutual and IndyMac, massive federal bailouts of American International 
Group (AIG) and Citigroup, and federally-assisted emergency acquisitions 
involving Countrywide, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia and National City); see 
also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 169-71, 176-81, 200-03, 221-23 
(discussing the same transactions). 
210 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 173-76; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra 
note 10, at 90-95; Levitin, supra note 10, at 152-57; U.S. Senate, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Collapse: 
Majority and Minority Staff Report (April 13, 2011) [hereinafter Senate 
Wall Street Report], at 4-5, 224-26. 
211 Frederick Tung & M. Todd Henderson, Pay for Regulator Performance, 
at 25 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 574, 2011), 
available at http://hq.ssrn.com/abstract=1916310; Wilmarth, supra note 10, 
at 907 n.100; Senate Wall Street Report, supra note 210, at 224-26. 
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preemptive rulings to help persuade state-chartered institutions that 
they should operate under federal charters as national banks or 
federal thrifts.212 OCC and OTS had strong financial incentives to 
induce depository institutions to operate as national banks or federal 
thrifts, because assessments paid by those institutions funded 
virtually all of OCC’s and OTS’ budgets.213   
In addition, federal regulators competed amongst themselves 
to enlarge their stables of regulatory clients. For example, FRB and 
OCC each sought to attract the patronage of major banks by 
approving new activities and reducing regulatory requirements.214 
Similarly, OTS persuaded Countrywide to convert from a national 
bank to a federal thrift in early 2007 by promising that OTS would 
give Countrywide more favorable supervisory treatment.215 Thus, 
efforts by federal agencies to attract the allegiance of large 
institutions resulted in domestic regulatory arbitrage and lax 
regulation.216 
OTS compiled the most egregious record of regulatory 
laxity, and Congress decided to abolish OTS when it passed Dodd-
Frank.217 For example, OTS granted extraordinary forbearance to 

212 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-62; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra 
note 10, at 143-44; Levitin, supra note 10, at 163-69; Wilmarth, supra note 
10, at 910-17. 
213 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra 
note 10, at 90-94; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 915-16. 
214 Wilmarth, supra note 52, at 265, 265 n.150, 275-77, 277 n.203; see also 
supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text (explaining that OCC has 
consistently supported the interests of national banks); CARNELL, MACEY & 
MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-67, 466-67, 491-94 (describing competition 
between OCC and FRB during the 1990s to maintain the loyalty of the 
largest banks, which could choose between status as national banks or as 
state Fed member banks); Richard M. Whiting, The New ‘Tri-Partite’ 
Banking System, 17 BANKING POL'Y REP. (Aspen) No. 7, at 1, 14-15 (April 
6, 1998) (observing that “overt rivalry” between OCC and FRB produced 
“expansive regulatory actions” by both agencies). 
215 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-60; Levitin, supra note 10, at 
159-60. 
216 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-66; Levitin, supra note 10, at 
155-60.  
217 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 25-26 (2010); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 10, at 174-84 (describing OTS’ regulatory failures); Binyamin 
Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over 
Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (same). 
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Washington Mutual (“WaMu”), the biggest federal thrift with $300 
billion of assets. WaMu’s assessments accounted for about one-
seventh of OTS’ total revenues, and OTS Director John Reich 
referred to WaMu in 2007 as “my largest constituent.”218 OTS 
examiners uncovered “more than 500 serious operational 
deficiencies” in WaMu’s lending and risk management practices 
between 2004 and 2008.219 However, OTS continued to rate WaMu 
as “fundamentally sound” until February 2008, and failed to take any 
public enforcement action against WaMu prior to its failure in 
September 2008.220 A Senate investigation concluded that OTS’ 
forbearance toward WaMu “reflected an OTS culture of deference to 
bank management, demoralized examiners whose oversight efforts 
were unsupported by their supervisors, and a narrow regulatory focus 
that allowed short-term profits to excuse high risk activities and 
disregarded systemic risk.”221  
Cross-border competition with foreign regulators also 
encouraged federal banking agencies to bend to the wishes of major 
banks. Regulators worried that any decision to impose stricter 
supervision on large U.S. financial institutions would cause those 
institutions to shift more of their operations to London and other 
foreign locations that offered “light touch” regulation.222 Federal 

218 Senate Wall Street Report, supra note 210, at 165, 210. 
219 Id. at 209. 
220 Id. at 161-62, 177, 209-30. In addition, from 2006 to 2008, OTS limited 
FDIC’s ability to examine WaMu and obstructed FDIC’s efforts to take 
more vigorous supervisory measures against WaMu. Id. at 196-208.  
221 Id. at 209. Federal investigators and commentators strongly criticized 
OTS for similar regulatory lapses that contributed to the failures of other 
leading thrifts, including IndyMac and Downey Federal. Id. at 233-35; 
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 176-81; Appelbaum & Nakashima, 
supra note 217. 
222 Dariusz Wójcik, The dark side of NY-LON: Financial centres and the 
global financial crisis 7 (Oxford University Sch. of Geography and the 
Environment Working Papers in Employment, Work and Finance No. 11-
12, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890644. For example, AIG 
Financial Products, which sold massive volumes of credit default swaps that 
destroyed its parent insurance company, conducted most of its operations in 
London. Id.; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 221-23. For discussions of 
international regulatory arbitrage and its impact on supervisory policies, see 
VIRAL V. ACHARYA, PAUL WACHTEL & INGO WALTER, International 
Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 365, 366-71 (Viral A. 
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agencies therefore repeatedly offered regulatory accommodations in 
an effort to persuade LCFIs to keep more of their assets in the U.S.223 
Thus, international as well as domestic regulatory competition 
discouraged federal regulators from adopting tougher policies that 
might have restrained speculative activities during the period leading 
up to the financial crisis. 
Third, during the past three decades, financial regulators and 
Wall Street officials developed a “confluence of perspectives and 
opinions” in which “Wall Street’s positions became the conventional 
wisdom in Washington.”224 Regulators maintained continuous 
contacts with LCFIs through (i) frequent consultations with bank 

Acharya & Matthew Richardson, eds., 2009); HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER 
& MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 283-84, 292-93 (2010); John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, 
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 707, 716-17, 721 (2009); Cristie L. Ford, Macro and Micro Level 
Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 
(2011) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773098, at 17-
18.  
223 Wójcik, supra note 222, at 7; Ford, supra note 222, at 17-18. During the 
quarter century leading up to the financial crisis, U.S. banking regulators 
sought to avoid imposing capital requirements on large U.S. banks that 
would place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign banks. 
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 45-64, 84-85, 210-14 (2008). For 
example, in 2004 federal regulators adopted an interagency rule setting a 
very low capital charge for banks that provided backup lines of credit to 
their sponsored off-balance-sheet conduits. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 974. 
In agreeing to that very lenient treatment, regulators noted that a proposed 
higher capital charge “would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to foreign banks.” Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 
44908, 44910 (July 28, 2004). U.S. banking agencies were not mistaken in 
fearing that LCFIs would shift operations and assets to jurisdictions with 
more accommodating regulatory schemes. A recent study found that, 
between 1996 and 2007, global banks headquartered in 26 developed 
countries were significantly more likely to transfer capital to other nations, 
and to open branches and subsidiaries in those nations, if the destination 
countries adopted fewer activity restrictions, lower capital requirements, 
weaker disclosure rules, looser auditing standards and more lenient 
supervisory policies. Joel F. Houston , Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory 
Arbitrage and International Bank Flows (Aug. 26, 2011), at 2-5, 17-19, 24-
29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525895. 
224 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 92-97. 
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representatives on important regulatory initiatives, and (ii) “dedicated 
examiner teams” that maintained permanent on-site offices at the 
largest banks and worked closely with bank managers.225 Regulators 
and industry insiders also shared close “social, educational, or 
experiential ties.”226 In contrast, regulators largely dismissed the 
views of consumer advocates and other outsiders, who lacked access 
to confidential supervisory information and frequently did not have 
specialized expertise related to derivatives and other financial 
innovations.227  
The “‘revolving door’ phenomenon” produced even closer 
relationships between regulators and industry leaders.228 LCFIs 
regularly hired “former agency employees familiar with the inner 
workings of the regulatory process.”229 Conversely, “as the world of 
finance became more complicated and more central to the economy,” 
the federal government increasingly relied on Wall Street veterans to 

225 Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward 
Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation (Aug. 14, 2011), at 13, 13 n.49, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924546; 
see also Levitin, supra note 10, at 159 (describing the presence of 
permanent teams of examiners at LCFIs).  
226 Ford, supra note 222, at 23. 
227 Omarova, supra note 225, at 13, 32-33 (describing the “secretive, closed-
door nature of the decision-making process involving financial regulators 
and industry actors”); see also Ford, supra note 222, at 23 (“Regulators 
operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and expertise-based band of 
human experience, characterized by relationships with sophisticated repeat 
players. . . . [Regulators] may be cognitively predisposed against ‘outsiders’ 
who either lack facility with the dominant jargon or who take issue with 
assumptions that no one in the industry take[s] issue with”); JOHNSON & 
KWAK, supra note 10, at 94 (“Financial policy took on the trappings of a 
branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on the 
cutting edge of innovation were qualified to comment”); Appelbaum, supra 
note 205 (reporting that FRB officials repeatedly dismissed warnings by 
consumer advocates about the dangers posed by nonprime mortgage 
lending). 
228 Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, 
at 93-97 (“[M]any senior officials moved back and forth between Wall 
Street and Washington.”).  
229 Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, 
at 94-96 (explaining that financial industry officials and regulators 
developed closer connections as experienced government officials 
increasingly opted to leave government service and enter the private sector). 
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fill senior regulatory positions.230 The continuous movement of 
senior officials between Wall Street and Washington encouraged 
regulators “to view their institutional interests or mission as largely 
congruent with the interests of their regulated industry 
constituency.”231  
Consequently, the aggressive deregulatory policies pursued 
by Alan Greenspan during his tenure as FRB chairman between 1987 
and 2006 were not an aberration. Rather, Greenspan’s policies 
reflected a widely-shared regulatory “mindset,” which included great 
faith in the ability of financial markets to “self-correct” and great 
skepticism about the federal government’s ability to regulate wisely 
or effectively.232 Officials who disagreed with that mindset “were 
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright 
new world of modern finance.”233  
Fourth, regulators were well aware of the enormous political 
clout wielded by large financial institutions and their allies. The 
financial sector (including finance, insurance and real estate firms) 
spent $5.1 billion on lobbying and campaign contributions between 

230 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 92-95. 
231 Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, 
at 93, 95 (“[A]s banking insiders gained power and influence in 
Washington, the positions they held . . . became orthodoxy inside the 
Beltway. . . [G]roupthink was a major reason why the federal government 
deferred to the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in the 1990s and 2000s.”). 
232 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898-906; see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 
10, at 167-96 (explaining that regulators adopted a “mindset” in the 1990s 
and 2000s that favored deregulation and placed great faith in the 
effectiveness of market discipline); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 
97-109, 133-43 (same).  
233 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 97; see id. at 103 (describing how 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) chief economist Raghuram Rajan 
“was met with a torrent of attacks by Greenspan’s defenders,” including 
FRB vice chairman Donald Kohn and Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers, when “Rajan presented a paper [in August 2005] asking in 
prophetic tones about whether deregulation and innovation had increased 
rather than decreased risk in the financial system”); id. at 7–9, 135–37 
(explaining that (i) CFTC chairman Brooksley Born “provoked furious 
opposition” when the CFTC issued a concept paper in May 1998, proposing 
a study of whether to strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter 
derivatives; and (ii) Ms. Born’s opponents—including Greenspan, 
Summers, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and SEC chairman Arthur 
Levitt—persuaded Congress to pass legislation barring the CFTC from 
acting on its proposal). 
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1998 and 2008.234 The financial sector was the “leading contributor 
to political campaigns” after 1990,235 and it accounted for 15% of 
total lobbying expenditures by all industry sectors between 1999 and 
2006.236 
The financial sector employed nearly 3,000 registered 
lobbyists in 2007.237 In 2008 and 2009, the six largest banks (Bank of 
America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley) employed more than 240 lobbyists who 
previously worked in the Executive Branch or Congress.238 Financial 
firms that were heavily involved in political lobbying also engaged in 
more risky activities. An IMF staff study determined that financial 
firms that engaged in the most intensive lobbying between 1999 and 
2006 also made higher-risk mortgage loans, securitized more of their 
loans, and suffered above-average losses in their stock market values 
during the financial crisis.239  
The financial sector received excellent legislative returns on 
its huge political investments. A second IMF staff study found that 
lobbying expenditures by financial firms significantly increased the 
likelihood of passage for bills favored by the financial services 
industry and also increased the probability of defeat for bills opposed 
by the industry.240 Lobbying by the financial sector helped to produce 

234 Essential Info. & Consumer Educ. Found., Sold Out: How Wall Street 
and Washington Betrayed America 6, 15-16, 99-101 (Mar. 2009) 
[hereinafter Sold Out], available at http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/ 
reports/sold_out.pdf. 
235 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 90; see Levitin, supra note 10, at 
160-61 (“The financial-services industry has been the single largest 
contributor to congressional campaigns since 1990.”). 
236 Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: 
Lobbying and the Financial Crisis 18, 32 (tbl.1a) (IMF Working Paper 
WP/09/87, Dec. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520. 
237 Sold Out, supra note 234, at 15-16, 100-01. 
238 Kevin Connor, Big Bank Takeover: How Too-Big-to-Fail’s Army of 
Lobbyists Has Captured Washington (Institute for America’s Future, May 
2010), available at http://www.ourfuture.org/files/documents/big-bank-
takeover-final.pdf. 
239 Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 236, at 4-6, 19-20, 22, 24-27. 
240 Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol 
Hill, and K Street 4, 15-18 (IMF Working Paper, June 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915164. In addition, the lobbying efforts of 
financial firms enjoyed greater success whenever (i) a member of Congress 
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a series of landmark political victories between 1994 and 2005, 
including enactment of (i) interstate banking legislation in 1994,241 
(ii) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) in 1999,242 (iii) the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) in 2000,243 and 
(iv) bankruptcy reform legislation in 2005.244 In addition to those 
affirmative victories, the financial services industry successfully 
blocked passage of more than a dozen bills introduced between 2000 
and 2007 that would have imposed tighter restrictions on high-risk 
mortgage lending.245 
Federal financial regulators who recommended tougher 
restraints on financial institutions experienced strong “pushback” 
from the industry.246 Regulators’ career interests and incentives 

formerly worked in the financial industry or (ii) a financial firm hired a 
lobbyist who had previously worked for a legislator. Id. 
241 See Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184 at 
1012-13 (describing the significance of Congress’ passage of interstate 
banking legislation, which “made possible the establishment of large 
nationwide banking organizations”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 
89. 
242 For discussions of the importance of GLBA, which repealed key 
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed commercial banks to 
affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by forming financial 
holding companies, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 89, 91-92, 
133-34; Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking supra note 184, at 
973-75.  
243 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 8-9, 92, 134-37 (describing 
CFMA, which largely exempted over-the-counter derivatives from federal 
regulation). 
244 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”) “radically altered the policies underlying consumer 
bankruptcy . . . , marking a significant shift in favor of creditors,” because 
BAPCA made it much more difficult for consumers to obtain a substantial 
or complete discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. Ronald J. Mann, 
Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 376-77; see Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy 
Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (surveying the changes made 
by BAPCPA to consumer bankruptcy statutes).   
245 Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 236, at 17-18, 55-59 (Appendix). 
246 Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 907-08; The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC 
Report], at 20-22, 172-73, 307; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, 
at 7-9, 97, 134-37 (describing how the financial industry successfully 
940 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31 

discouraged them from challenging the formidable political power 
wielded by LCFIs and their allies.247 Deregulation and forbearance 
were safer alternatives for regulators, especially during a period of 
apparently unprecedented prosperity for the financial sector.248 
 
4. CFPB Is Likely To Be More Resistant to 
Regulatory Capture than the Federal 
Banking Agencies 
 
In view of the financial services industry’s success in 
securing extensive forbearance from federal bank regulators during 
the past two decades, why should we expect CFPB to be more 
resistant to industry pressure? There are at least two major reasons 
for optimism. First, CFPB’s unified mission makes it different from 
most federal banking agencies. As described above, prudential 
regulators typically gave short shrift to consumer protection and 
instead focused on increasing the banking industry’s “safety and 
soundness” by adopting policies that promoted higher short-term 
profits for banks.249 In contrast, CFPB has a single clear mandate to 
protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, abusive or discriminatory 
practices.250 While Dodd-Frank requires CFPB to consider the 
potential costs and benefits of its proposed rules, and to respond to 
safety-and-soundness concerns raised by prudential regulators, 

resisted tougher regulation); Tung & Henderson, supra note 211, at 29-30 
(explaining that when regulators issued mild warnings about risky lending 
in 2006, “[t]housands of industry comments poured in objecting to the 
regulators' intrusion, and the FDIC and other agencies backed off, clarifying 
that they didn't intend to impose limits”); Sold Out, supra note 234, at 8, 42-
49 (observing that “officials in government who dared to propose stronger 
protections for investors and consumers consistently met with hostility and 
defeat”).  
247 Tung & Henderson, supra note 211, at 28-30. 
248 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 7-9, 97, 103-09, 134-43, 151-52; 
FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 173, 307. 
249 See supra notes 197-20911 and accompanying text; Bar-Gill & Warren, 
supra note 10, at 90-91 (“These agencies are designed with a primary 
mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This 
means protecting banks' profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a 
lesser priority . . . .”); Levitin, supra note 10, at 155-56 (explaining that 
“[r]egulators have permitted profitability-protection to trump consumer 
protection for all but the most egregious behavior”). 
250 Dodd-Frank § 1021(b); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11, 164 (2010). 
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CFPB’s consumer protection mission remains paramount. The 
unambiguous primacy of that mission should motivate CFPB to take 
its statutory responsibilities seriously.251 
 Second, CFPB’s institutional safeguards—including its 
policymaking autonomy and its assured source of funding252—make 
it substantially more insulated from industry capture compared to 
OCC, CFTC, SEC and FRB. As shown above, OCC relies for most 
of its funding on assessments paid by national banks, and OCC could 
lose significant funding if major national banks converted to state-
chartered banks. OCC therefore has powerful budgetary incentives to 
please its largest regulatory constituents.253 As discussed in the next 
section, CFTC and SEC rely on congressional appropriations and are 
therefore highly vulnerable to budgetary leverage exerted by 
congressional allies of their regulated constituents.  
FRB is not subject to the same type of industry-related 
budgetary pressures. FRB and the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) as 
a whole finance their operations by drawing on earnings from the 
Fed’s investment portfolio of Treasury securities and other debt 
instruments.254 However, the Fed is subject to significant industry 
influence due to the unique governance structure for the twelve 
regional Federal Reserve Banks (“Reserve Banks”).255 Member 
banks in each Fed district elect three Class A directors and three 
Class B directors for that district’s Reserve Bank, while FRB 
appoints three Class C directors. In each district, Class B directors 
and Class C directors vote jointly to select the Reserve Bank’s 

251 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 10, at 98-100. By maintaining CFPB’s 
single-Director governance structure, Congress would enhance CFPB’s 
accountability to the public for carrying out its consumer protection 
mission. See Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 11 (“A CFPB Director 
who . . . fails to do enough to protect consumers cannot deflect blame for his 
actions.”). 
252 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s 
autonomy and its guaranteed source of funding from the Fed). 
253 See supra notes 128-140, 212-16 and accompanying text.  
254 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62. 
255 Renee B. Adams, “Who Directs the Fed?” 3-5, 10-14 (European 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 293, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1756509 (discussing the structure and 
responsibilities of the Reserve Banks); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, FED. RES. BANK GOVERNANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BROADEN 
DIRECTOR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND INCREASE TRANSPARENCY , GAO-
12-18 , 6-7, 9-16, 41 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Fed Governance Report]. 
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president. Thus, member banks elect two-thirds of the directors of 
each Reserve Bank, and member banks indirectly exercise (through 
Class B directors) shared control over the selection of Reserve Bank 
presidents.256  
The voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(“FOMC”), which determines the nation’s monetary policy, include 
FRB’s seven governors and five Reserve Bank presidents. The 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York 
Fed”) is a permanent FOMC voting member, while four FOMC 
voting seats rotate among the remaining eleven Reserve Bank 
presidents. All twelve Reserve Bank presidents are entitled to attend 
and participate in FOMC meetings.257 In addition, each Reserve Bank 
is responsible (under FRB’s oversight) for examining and 
supervising state member banks and bank holding companies 
headquartered in the Reserve Bank’s district.258 Thus, Reserve Bank 
presidents play significant roles in the Fed’s monetary policy 
decisions and bank supervisory policies.  
At first glance, the Federal Reserve Act appears to call for a 
diversity of backgrounds among directors of Reserve Banks. Class A 
directors usually are senior bank executives, but Class B and Class C 
directors are not allowed to serve as directors, officers or employees 
of banks, and Class C directors may not own bank stocks.259 In 

256 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 10-13. Prior to the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, Class A directors also voted to elect Reserve 
Bank presidents, and member banks therefore controlled the selection of 
presidents through their ability to elect Class A and Class B directors. 
Dodd-Frank removed the right of Class A directors to vote for Reserve 
Bank presidents, so that the power to select presidents is now divided 
equally between Class B directors (elected by member banks) and Class C 
directors (appointed by FRB). Id. at 10, 53; H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 876 
(2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 732. 
257 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 6-9, 14-16. 
258 Id. at 7. 
259 12 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303, 304 (1977); see GAO Fed Governance Report, 
supra note 255, at 10-12 (describing the requirements for Class A, B, and C 
directors). FRB designates one Class C director as the chairman of the board 
for each Reserve Bank. Strangely, however, while the Federal Reserve Act 
prohibits Class C directors from owning bank stocks, the Act requires the 
chairman to have “tested banking experience.” 12 U.S.C. §§ 303, 305 
(1977); see GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 10-12 
(explaining that the Class C director serving as board chairman must have 
“tested banking experience”).  
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addition, the Federal Reserve Act provides that Class B and Class C 
directors should “represent the public . . . with due but not exclusive 
consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, 
services, labor and consumers.”260  
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve Act’s apparent 
preference for diversity, the boards of directors of Reserve Banks 
have typically been dominated by senior executives of major banks, 
large financial firms and leading nonfinancial corporations that are 
customers of the biggest banks. A recent study found that “class A 
[Reserve Bank] directorships are dominated by large banks.”261 The 
study determined that bank size was the most significant factor in 
determining whether a particular bank was represented by a Class A 
director between 1987 and 2009, while factors related to bank 
performance were much less important.262 For example, Jamie 
Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase—the nation’s largest bank—
serves as a Class A director of the New York Fed.263 
Similarly, despite their statutorily prescribed role as 
representatives of the public, Class B and Class C directors have 
frequently been drawn from the ranks of senior executives of large 
nonbank financial companies and big nonfinancial corporations that 
are clients of major banks. For example, Richard Fuld, chairman of 
Lehman Brothers, served as a Class B director of the New York Fed 
until shortly before his firm declared bankruptcy in September 
2008.264 During 2008 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of 
directors also included Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric 
(a Class B director), and Stephen Friedman, a director and former 

260 12 U.S.C. § 302 (1977). 
261 Adams, supra note 255, at 21-25. 
262 Id.  
263 See Jamie Dimon’s biography, N.Y. FED, http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
aboutthefed/orgchart/board/dimon.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) 
(describing Jamie Dimon’s experience); Alan Kline, JP Morgan Chase 
Overtakes B of A as Largest U.S. Bank, AM. BANKER, Oct. 19, 2011 
(reporting that JP Morgan Chase had become the biggest U.S. bank and had 
$2.29 trillion of assets as of Sept. 30, 2011, compared to $2.22 trillion of 
assets for Bank of America). 
264 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 35-36; Neil Irwin, N.Y. 
Fed Chairman Resigns: Friedman’s Role as Goldman Sachs Director 
Questioned, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009. 
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chairman of Goldman Sachs (a Class C director), whom FRB 
designated as chairman of the board of the New York Fed.265  
A recent GAO study on Fed governance determined that 
seventy-three of the Reserve Bank’s head office directors serving 
from 2006 to 2010 were drawn from the banking industry, while only 
eleven head office directors during that period were representatives 
of consumers or labor.266 In addition, Class B and Class C directors 
of Reserve Banks have included senior executives of major 
nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the largest banks.267 
Thus, members of Reserve Bank boards of directors have 
predominantly reflected the views and interests of major banks and 
their clients and financial counterparties.  
Stephen Friedman’s service at the New York Fed provided a 
striking example of the conflicts of interest that have resulted from 
close linkages between the Fed and top financial executives. After 
Goldman converted to a bank holding company in September 2008, 
FRB granted a waiver that allowed Friedman (i) to continue serving 
as a Class C director and as chairman of the board of the New York 
Fed and (ii) to retain his ownership of 46,000 shares of Goldman 
stock. Without the FRB’s waiver, Friedman would have been 
disqualified from serving as a Class C director unless he resigned his 
Goldman directorship and divested his Goldman stock.268 Moreover, 
Friedman purchased 37,000 additional shares of Goldman stock 
while his waiver request was pending, and during that period the 
New York Fed directed AIG to pay $14 billion to Goldman, 

265 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-34, 35 (fig. 10), 39; 
Scott Lanman, Friedman Quits New York Fed on Concern About Goldman 
Sachs Ties, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 8, 2009, available at http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a68WNA7cKzu8.  
266 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 19 (fig. 4), 21. 
267 Orson Aguilar, Viewpoint: N.Y. Fed Board Move Tone-Deaf On Public 
Service, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 2009, at 9 (criticizing the appointment of 
Pfizer’s chief executive officer, Jeffrey Kindler, as a Class B director of the 
New York Fed, because Pfizer relied on loans from Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase to finance its recent 
merger with Wyeth); Steven Sloan, As Fed’s Role Grows, Doubt Spurs 
Critics, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2009, available at http://www. 
americanbanker.com/issues/174_97/-378660-1.html?zkPrintable=true 
(reporting that Pepsico’s chief executive was a Class B director at the New 
York Fed, while senior executives of United Parcel Service, Home Depot 
and Chevron served as Class C directors at other Federal Reserve Banks).  
268 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-34, 35 (fig. 10). 
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representing full payment of AIG’s obligations to Goldman under 
credit default swaps (“CDS”).269 In addition, Friedman led the search 
committee for a new president of the New York Fed after Timothy 
Geithner left that position to become Treasury Secretary, and the 
New York Fed ultimately selected William Dudley, Goldman’s 
former chief economist, as its new president.270 Friedman resigned as 
a Class C director and as chairman of the New York Fed in May 
2009, after his dual role provoked intense controversy and 
widespread criticism.271  
A GAO report issued in October 2011 warned that “[h]aving 
the Class A directors, who represent member banks, and the Class B 
directors, who are elected by member banks . . . creates an 
appearance of a conflict of interest.”272 The GAO found that this 

269 Aaron Lorenzo, Investigations: House Panel Delving Deeper Into 
Holdings Of Former New York Fed Chair in Goldman, 94 BNA BANKING 
REP. 551 (2010); Letter from the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform to Ben S. Bernanke, FRB Chairman (Mar. 18, 2010), available at 
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Correspondence/3-18-
10-Honorable_Ben_Bernanke-Chairman_Board_of_Gov-AIG.pdf. 
[hereinafter House Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship] After the 
Fed and the Treasury Department rescued AIG in September 2008, the New 
York Fed directed AIG to pay off its obligations to CDS counterparties at 
“100% of face value,” a decision that provoked sharp criticism from two 
government oversight bodies. AIG paid Goldman $14 billion to discharge 
CDS obligations, and Goldman was the second-largest recipient of CDS 
payments from AIG. FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 376-79 (listing AIG’s 
payments to CDS counterparties, including Goldman, and citing strong 
criticisms of those payments in two reports issued by the Special Inspector 
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”) and the 
Congressional Oversight Panel).  
270 Irwin, supra note 264; Lanman, supra note 265. 
271 Irwin, supra note 264 (reporting that Friedman’s service at the New York 
Fed and FRB’s waiver became “Exhibit A for what critics perceive as a too-
cozy relationship between the New York Fed, which serves as the central 
bank’s eyes and ears on Wall Street, and the bankers it oversees”); House 
Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship, supra note 269 (declaring that 
“Mr. Friedman’s dual role at the New York Fed and Goldman, his purchase 
of Goldman stock in December 2008, and the Federal Reserve’s waiver of 
his conflict of its conflict of interest policy after the fact, raise serious 
questions about the integrity of the Fed’s operations”). 
272 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 41; see id. at 32 
(stating that Reserve Bank “directors’ affiliations with financial firms . . . 
continue to pose reputational risks to the Federal Reserve System”); 
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perceived conflict of interest was accentuated during the financial 
crisis, because “at least 18 former and current Class A, B and C 
directors from 9 Reserve Banks . . . were affiliated with institutions 
that used at least one [Fed-administered] emergency program.”273 For 
example, the New York Fed provided emergency assistance to a 
major bank and three large financial firms while executives of all 
four organizations served as directors of the New York Fed.274 
Researchers have confirmed that banks have received 
material benefits while their executives served as directors of 
Reserve Banks. Two academic studies found that banks were 
significantly more likely to receive capital assistance under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) if their executives served 
as directors of either Reserve Banks or Reserve Bank branches.275 A 
third study determined that (i) banks whose executives were elected 
as Reserve Bank Class A directors between 1990 and 2009 
experienced significant abnormal gains in their stock market values, 
and (ii) banks whose executives served as Reserve Bank directors 
during that twenty-year period were significantly less likely to fail 

Cheyenne Hopkins, Crisis or No, Debate Over Reg Reform Splintering, AM. 
BANKER, May 21, 2009, at 1 (quoting Senator Shelby’s statement during a 
Senate committee hearing that “[a]n inherent web of conflict is built into the 
DNA of the Fed as it now exists”); Sloan, supra note 267 (quoting Kevin 
Jacques, a prominent academic, who described the governance structure for 
Federal Reserve Banks as “really, really clubby”). 
273 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 39. 
274 Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase, served as a Class A 
director of the New York Fed while his bank “participated in various 
emergency programs and served as one of the clearing banks for emergency 
lending programs” administered by the New York Fed. Id. at 40; Donna 
Borak, GAO Fears Conflicts of Interest at Fed, AM. BANKER, Oct. 20, 2011, 
at 2. Similarly, as previously noted, executives of three major financial 
firms served as directors of the New York Fed while their institutions 
participated in Fed emergency programs. Richard Fuld, chairman of 
Lehman Brothers, and Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric, served 
as Class B directors, while Stephen Friedman, a director and former 
chairman of Goldman Sachs, served as a Class C director and as chairman 
of the board. GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-36, 39.  
275 Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, TARP Investments: Financials and 
Politics 3-4, 19-20, 31-32, 35 (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. 1127, 
2010), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/ 
63451/9/1127_duchin_oct10.pdf; Lei Li, TARP Funds Distribution and 
Bank Loan Growth 3-4, 20 (April 22, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567073. 
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(compared with other banks), and none of those banks failed after 
receiving government assistance.276 The foregoing evidence indicates 
that large financial institutions have exerted substantial influence on 
Fed policies through their election of bank executives and client 
executives as Reserve Bank directors. Thus, despite the Fed’s 
political and financial autonomy, the Fed’s governance structure 
evidently has made it vulnerable to considerable industry influence. 
 In contrast to OCC and the Fed, FDIC has demonstrated a 
significantly higher degree of independence from industry influence. 
Like CFPB, FDIC has a clearly defined mission and an assured 
source of funding. FDIC views its fundamental purpose as protecting 
bank depositors and defending the integrity of the Deposit Insurance 
Fund (“DIF”).277 FDIC also has a guaranteed funding source that is 
not subject to congressional control or vulnerable to charter 
competition. FDIC collects risk-adjusted assessments from FDIC-
insured institutions, and virtually all banks operate with FDIC 
insurance.278 
 FDIC has frequently demonstrated its commitment to 
protecting the DIF as well as its willingness to resist banking 
industry influence. Over the past three decades, bank representatives 
have repeatedly criticized the agency for imposing higher capital 
requirements on banks in order to safeguard the DIF. Critics have 
mocked FDIC’s acronym as standing for “Forever Demanding 
Increased Capital.”279 During the late 1990s and early 2000s, FDIC 

276 Adams, supra note 255, at 28-39.  
277 DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE 
GREAT PANIC 219-20 (2009) (stating that FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair was 
“a fierce and relentless defender of the FDIC fund [during the financial 
crisis], putting protection of that kitty above all else”); Tom Fox, How the 
FDIC got to the top of the heap: The No. 1-ranked agency’s leader extols 
his workers’ sense of purpose, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2011, at B4 (quoting 
Acting FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg’s view that “[t]he great strength 
of the [FDIC] is that it has a very clear and understandable mission, and that 
mission is to insure the deposits that people have in federally insured 
financial institutions”).  
278 CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62-63, 316-18; MICHAEL 
P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION § 1.11 (West Concise 
Hornbook, 3d ed. 2011). 
279 For examples of this mocking description of FDIC, see All Things 
Considered: “FDIC Chief Earned Rep As a Consumer Advocate,” Nat’l 
Pub. Radio broadcast, June 27, 2011 (transcript available on Lexis) (quoting 
banking industry consultant Bert Ely’s use of the same description); Barbara 
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fought hard to maintain tougher capital rules for U.S. banks 
(including leverage capital requirements) during international 
negotiations over the Basel II capital accord. FDIC also strongly 
questioned the reliability of Basel II’s “advanced internal risk-based” 
(“A-IRB”) method for determining capital requirements. In contrast, 
the Fed aligned itself with the largest banks in pushing for 
incorporation of the A-IRB methodology into the Basel II accord.280 
FDIC’s deep skepticism about the A-IRB approach proved to be 
well-founded when LCFIs relied on internal risk-based models “to 
operate with capital levels that were ‘very, very low, . . . 
unacceptably low’ during the period leading up to the financial 
crisis.”281 
 During the crisis, FDIC chairman Sheila Bair disagreed with 
Fed and Treasury officials on several occasions about the desirability 
of establishing bailout programs for large troubled financial 
institutions. For example, FDIC refused to concur with the New 
York Fed and Treasury in using the “systemic risk exception” 

A. Rehm, Editor at Large: Endgame for Bair Is No Less Audacious, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 18, 2010, at 1 (quoting same description, and reporting that 
FDIC has consistently been the strongest proponent of tougher capital rules 
for banks); Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr., Comment: Issuing Trust-Preferred Too 
Good a Game to Sit Out, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21, 1998; Jed Horowitz, Let 
‘Em Eat Leverage, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 1990, at 2; Paul M. Horvitz, The 
Increase in Capital Standards Will Make Banking Safer, AM. BANKER, Aug. 
24, 1988, at 4 (quoting same description, and observing that “FDIC wants 
increased capital because bank capital provides a cushion for the insurance 
system against losses due to bank failures,” while “[b]ankers oppose higher 
capital standards because they fear that higher capital ratios result in a lower 
return on equity”); Washington’s Financial Cops at a Glance: American 
Banker Guide to the Regulators, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1984, at 29 (quoting 
same description); Paul S. Nadler, A Conference of Directors in Michigan 
Shows Banking Communications at Work, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1980, at 4 
(quoting same description, and noting that “bankers and board members 
agreed that a bank should try to get away with as little capital as possible”). 
280 TARULLO, supra note 223, at 99-130; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
“Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail 
Problem,” 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 759 n.203 (2010). 
281 Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 1010 (quoting 
Base Camp Basel, ECONOMIST, Jan 21, 2010, available at www.economist. 
com/node/15328883). 
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(“SRE”)282 to protect WaMu’s bondholders when WaMu failed on 
September 25, 2008. Bair insisted that WaMu’s uninsured 
bondholders, rather than the DIF and taxpayers, should bear the 
losses caused by WaMu’s reckless lending policies.283 Similarly, 
FDIC originally resisted proposals by Treasury and the Fed to use the 
SRE on two subsequent occasions: (i) on September 29, 2008, when 
federal officials invoked the SRE to protect uninsured creditors 
(including bondholders) when Wachovia failed, and (ii) in October 
2008, when federal officials approved a program to guarantee debt 
securities issued by FDIC-insured banks. On both occasions, Fed and 
Treasury officials exerted great pressure to overcome Bair’s 
reluctance to expose the DIF to potential losses by invoking the 
SRE.284  
 FDIC also demonstrated a much tougher attitude than the 
Fed and OCC when the largest banks sought to exit the TARP capital 
assistance program by repurchasing the preferred stock they had sold 
to Treasury. From November 2009 to June 2011, FDIC tried 
unsuccessfully to force several major banks (including Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo and PNC) to issue to investors at least $1 in 
new common stock for every $2 of TARP preferred stock they 
repurchased from Treasury. FDIC insisted on the 1-for-2 ratio in 
order to “increase the quality” of the seven banks’ capital structures 
and limit the risk those banks posed to the DIF.285 However, OCC 
pushed for much more lenient terms for the big banks, and FRB took 
an intermediate position. Over the FDIC’s objections, regulators 
ultimately allowed the banks to repurchase their TARP preferred 
stock while failing to meet the 1-for-2 ratio advocated by FDIC.286 

282 Id. at 1001, 1022-23 (discussing the SRE embodied in 12 U.S.C. § 
1823(c)(4)(G), and observing that concurrence among the Treasury, Fed and 
FDIC is required to invoke the SRE).  
283 WESSEL, supra note 277, at 218-21 (explaining that New York Fed 
President Timothy Geithner argued strongly that the SRE should have been 
invoked to authorize FDIC to protect bondholders when WaMu failed, but 
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke agreed with FDIC chairman Bair’s position 
that the SRE should not be used); FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 366 
(stating that Treasury officials also disagreed with Chairman Bair’s 
position). 
284 WESSEL, supra note 277, at 221-23, 232-33; FCIC Report, supra note 
246, at 366-69. 
285 “Exiting TARP: Repayments by the Largest Financial Institutions,” 
SIGTARP Audit Report 11-005 (Sept. 29, 2011), at 19-30. 
286 Id. at 20-63. 
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  Former FRB Vice Chairman Donald Kohn summarized the 
positions of the three agencies in the following terms: “[W]hile FDIC 
wanted the 1-for-2 to be met entirely with new common stock, “the 
OCC was much more relaxed than that, and [FRB] was a little more 
relaxed than the FDIC.”287 Similarly, FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo 
explained that “FDIC was understandably concerned about its 
exposure to institutions through [its debt guarantee program] and the 
deposit insurance fund, [while] OCC tends to look more narrowly at 
specific national banks with less of a macro perspective.”288 
 In sum, FDIC’s clearly-defined mission and its secure source 
of funding have encouraged the agency to act with more 
independence from the banking industry, compared to OCC and the 
Fed. A recent study concluded that, while FDIC made some 
supervisory mistakes during the subprime lending boom, its overall 
regulatory record during the subprime lending boom was better than 
that of OCC and the Fed.289 The FDIC’s greater willingness to resist 
industry influence indicates that CFPB’s unambiguous mission and 
assured funding should encourage a similarly independent attitude 
within CFPB.290 
 

287 Id. at 20 (quoting Mr. Kohn’s remarks to SIGTARP). 
288 Id. (summarizing Mr. Tarullo’s statement to SIGTARP). 
289 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-205; see id. at 163 (observing 
that state banks supervised by FDIC and FRB recorded much lower default 
rates on their mortgage loans from 2006 to 2008 compared to national banks 
regulated by OCC and federal thrifts regulated by OTS); id. at 184-87 
(criticizing FDIC for failing to stop unsound subprime lending by Fremont 
Investment & Loan and Franklin Bank, but noting that those failures 
appeared to be “isolated instances,” while “the OCC and the OTS were in a 
state of denial about the grave nature of [national] bank and [federal] thrift 
involvement in reckless lending and the equally grave nature of their own 
failure to supervise”); id. at 204-05 (showing that FRB, OCC and OTS 
supervised 11 of the 15 largest subprime lenders in 2006, while FDIC 
regulated only one of those lenders (Fremont)).  
290 See Barkow, supra note 7, at 44-45, 77 (concluding that that CFPB’s 
“guaranteed funding stream” from the Fed provides the bureau with 
significant insulation against industry capture). 
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C. Requiring CFPB to Depend on Congressional 
Appropriations for Its Budget Would Make 
CFPB Vulnerable to Political and Industry 
Capture 
 
The Republican-sponsored House legislation would remove 
a crucial guarantee of CFPB’s autonomy by giving Congress 
complete control over CFPB’s budget.291 Any regulatory agency that 
depends on Congress for its budget is vulnerable to political 
influence exerted by the regulated industry through the 
appropriations process.292 For example, Congress controls CPSC’s 
budget, and since its creation in 1980 the agency has been 
“chronically underfunded and understaffed. . . . As a result, CPSC 
has been no match for the industry participants it is charged with 
regulating.”293 
Except for CFTC and SEC, no federal financial regulator is 
subject to congressional appropriations.294 Congress has undermined 
the effectiveness of CFTC and SEC over the past two decades by 
frequently failing to provide those agencies with adequate funds.295 

291 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing a Republican-
backed House bill that would make CFPB’s entire budget subject to 
congressional appropriations). 
292 Barkow, supra note 7, at 42-44. 
293 Id. at 67; see also id. at 42 n.103, 44, 67 (describing CPSC’s lack of 
adequate resources to fulfill its statutory mandate, due to Congress’ refusal 
to increase its budget); Andrew Zajac, New leadership on U.S. product 
safety: Obama vows to revitalize ailing CPSC, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2009, at 
C14 (reporting that CPSC had been “underfunded for years” and had only 
430 employees in 2009, compared with 978 in 1980; as a result, the “gutted 
agency became a docile captive of the industry it regulates”). 
294 Sean Lengell, Schumer: Boost SEC’s budget to fight fraud, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at A09. 
295 Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Speech at the 
Brodsky Family Lecture at Northwestern Univ. Law School (Nov. 9, 2010) 
(stating that, when Ms. Schapiro became SEC chairman in January 2009, 
the SEC was “underfunded and understaffed . . . . We were behind, and 
falling further behind”), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2010/spch110910mls.htm; Enhanced Investor Protection After the 
Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 5, 13 (2011) (statement of Lynn Turner, Former 
SEC Chief Accountant) (stating that one reason why CFTC and SEC were 
“ineffective” during the decade leading up to the financial crisis was that 
both agencies “lacked adequate funding and resources;” in particular, “SEC 
952 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31 

After Republicans took control of the House in the 2010 midterm 
elections, Republican leaders announced plans to delay the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank’s reforms of the derivatives and 
securities markets by squeezing the budgets of CFTC and SEC.296 
Incoming House majority leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) reportedly said 
that “denying funds to the SEC and other agencies is ‘what the 
American people are expecting.’”297  
During 2011, Republicans blocked any significant increases 
in the CFTC’s and SEC’s operating budgets.298 At congressional 
oversight hearings in December 2011, CFTC chairman Gary Gensler 
and SEC chairman Mary Schapiro expressed grave doubts about their 
agencies’ ability to adopt and enforce the new regulations required 
by Dodd-Frank unless Congress approved major increases in their 
budgets.299 Republican leaders and the financial services industry did 

was essentially starved by Congress of necessary resources during much of 
the 1990s,” and SEC again lacked adequate funding between 2005 and 
2007), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse 
Action=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=c7085db2-ae43-471a-aa5c-
357f2226a096&Witness_ID=df29c589-0882-4468-b4be-96f53902b567; 
Memo to Congress: It’s time for SEC to be self-funded, INVESTMENT NEWS, 
May 16, 2011, at 0008 (stating that “SEC has been chronically underfunded 
for years”) (available on Lexis); Richard Sansom, Republicans’ return to 
power threatens CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank, SNL DAILY GAS 
REPORT, Jan. 12, 2011 (reporting that “CFTC has been underfunded for at 
least a decade”).  
296 Bruce Carton, How Can Congress Kill Dodd-Frank? By Underfunding 
It, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 2011; Kelsey Snell, Industry Looks to Derail 
Dodd-Frank Enforcement, NAT’L J., Feb. 15, 2011. 
297 Carton, supra note 296 (quoting Rep. Cantor). 
298 Id.; William D. Cohan, Republicans Try to Starve Wall Street Watchdog, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 27, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2011-11-27/republicans-try-to-starve-wall-street-watchdog-
william-d-cohan.html; Sansom, supra note 295 ; Robert Schmidt et al., The 
Great Regulatory Hold-Up, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 14-20, 
2011, at 24; James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall St. Is Tossed a 
Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at A1; see Roger Nayak, The sticky 
politics of MF Global’s demise, SNL FINANCIAL SERVICES DAILY, Dec. 7, 
2011 (reporting that “some observers feel that tightened budgets have 
hamstrung the CFTC and the SEC” in their efforts to implement Dodd-
Frank, and noting that the agencies had missed 71 of 95 deadlines for 
adopting rules to carry out Dodd-Frank’s reforms of derivatives regulation). 
299 Joe Adler, MF Global, Gensler Dominate Hearing on Derivatives Rules, 
AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker. 
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not disagree with these gloomy assessments of the likely impact of 
budget stringency on the two agencies.300 Rather, they seem 
determined to “defang Dodd-Frank” by “squeezing [CFTC and SEC] 
through the budget process.”301 
 As discussed above, Republican legislators and major banks 
took a very different position when they pushed for legislation to 
create FHFA as a new and more powerful regulator for Fannie and 
Freddie.302 Republicans and their banking allies insisted that FHFA 
must have an independent, secure funding source that was not subject 
to congressional appropriations. They pointed out that Fannie and 
Freddie had frequently used their political clout to persuade Congress 
to cut OFHEO’s budget and thereby undermine OFHEO’s 
enforcement efforts. Representative Richard Baker (R-LA), a leading 
proponent of legislation to establish FHFA, declared that OFHEO 
“historically has been impaired” because it “must come to the 
Congress for its funding.”303 Baker emphasized the importance of 

com/issues/176_232/dodd-frank-act-mfglobal-1044523-1html?zkPrintable= 
true; Lindsey White, As regulators face Senate, Gensler grilled over MF 
Global, SNL BANK AND THRIFT DAILY, Dec. 7, 2011; see Kevin Wack, 
Reform Implementation and Budget Crunch Collide, AM. BANKER, July 22, 
2011, at 4 (reporting on congressional testimony by CFTC chairman 
Gensler and SEC chairman Schapiro that their agencies could not fulfill 
their responsibilities under Dodd-Frank without significant budget 
increases). 
300 See Snell, supra note 296 (reporting that CFTC chairman Gensler’s 
“worries” about his agency’s ability to implement Dodd-Frank with a 
constrained budget “are music to the industry”). 
301 Id. For other commentators expressing the same view, see, e.g., Carton, 
supra note 296; Cohan, supra note 298 (discussing Republican efforts to cut 
CFTC budget); Stewart, supra note 298 (discussing the Republicans’ 
success in cutting SEC’s budget by $200 million). 
302 See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text (describing support by 
Republicans and major banks for establishment of FHFA as a more 
powerful regulator for Fannie and Freddie). 
303 151 CONG. REC. H9131 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2005) (remarks of Rep. 
Baker). In the following passage, a prominent journalist described how 
Fannie’s supporters in Congress used the appropriations process to 
hamstring OFHEO’s supervisory effort:  
 
Fannie’s allies in Congress . . . made sure that . . . 
OFHEO, unlike any other [financial] regulator, would be 
subject to the appropriations process, meaning its funding 
was at the mercy of politicians – politicians who often 
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creating “an independently funded regulator, with all the tools a 
modern regulator should have to oversee vastly complex financial 
enterprises to protect the American taxpayer from unwarranted 
losses.”304 The final legislation established FHFA as a “strong, 
independent regulator” funded by assessments collected from the 
GSEs, and the legislation stipulated that FHFA would not be subject 
to the appropriations process.305   
In creating CFPB, Congress drew directly on FHFA’s secure 
funding model. The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank 
declared that “the assurance of adequate funding [from the Fed], 
independent of the Congressional appropriations process, is 
absolutely essential to the independent operations of any financial 
regulator.”306 The Senate report pointed out that the need for 
independent funding of financial regulators  
 
was a hard learned lesson from the difficulties faced 
by [OFHEO], which was subject to repeated 
Congressional pressure because it was forced to go 
through the annual appropriations process. It is 
widely acknowledged that this helped limit 
OFHEO’s effectiveness. For that reason, ensuring 
that OFHEO”s successor agency . . . would not be 
subject to appropriations was a high priority for the 
Committee and the Congress in [passing] the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.307 
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took their cues from Fannie. Not surprisingly, OFHEO 
was a notoriously weak regulator. 
 
Bethany McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2009, at 51; 
see also Binyamin Appelbaum et al., How Washington Failed to Rein In 
Fannie, Freddie: As Profits Grew, Firms Used Their Power to Mask Peril, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at A01 (reporting that OFHEO “was required 
to get its budget approved by Congress, while agencies that regulated banks 
set their own budgets. That gave congressional allies [of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac] an easy way to exert pressure” on OFHEO). 
304 151 CONG. REC. H9131 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2005) (remarks of Rep. 
Baker). 
305 H.R. REP. NO. 110-142, at 87-88, 126-27 (2007). 
306 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 163 (2010). 
307 Id.   
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 Several Republican leaders who are pushing for legislation to 
subject CFPB to the appropriations process were strong proponents 
of secure funding for FHFA.308 It is therefore very difficult to 
identify any persuasive rationale for the attempt to remove CFPB’s 
budgetary independence beyond the desire “to undercut an agency 
[Republican leaders] never liked to begin with.”309 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Congress decided to establish CFPB after concluding that 
federal bank regulators repeatedly failed to protect consumers during 
the credit boom leading up to the financial crisis. Because of the 
prudential regulators’ systematic failures to protect consumers, 
Congress vested CFPB with sole responsibility and clear 
accountability for implementing effective consumer safeguards. Title 
X of Dodd-Frank authorizes CFPB to issue regulations, conduct 
investigations and prosecute enforcement proceedings to protect 
consumers against unfair, deceptive, abusive and discriminatory 
financial practices. Title X promotes CFPB’s independence from 
political influence by granting CFPB autonomy in its policymaking, 
rulemaking and enforcement functions and by giving CFPB an 
assured source of funding from the Fed.  
The financial services industry and most Republican 
members of Congress vehemently opposed CFPB’s creation, and 
they have sought to prevent CFPB from implementing its mandate 
under Title X. In July 2011, the Republican-controlled House passed 
legislation that would fundamentally change CFPB’s governance, 
authority and funding. That legislation would seriously undermine 
CFPB’s autonomy and effectiveness by (i) changing CFPB’s 
leadership structure from a single Director to a five-member 
commission, (ii) giving federal prudential regulators a greatly 
enhanced veto power over CFPB’s rules, and (iii) requiring CFPB to 
obtain congressional appropriations to fund its operations. Similarly, 
Republican Senators declared that they would block confirmation of 
any CFPB Director until the Senate approved legislation making the 

308 Davidson, supra note 147 (noting that Representatives Spencer Bachus 
(R-AL), Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Ed Royce (R-CA) and other current 
Republican House members supported legislation to establish a GSE 
regulator whose funding would not be subject to congressional 
appropriations). 
309 Id. 
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same three changes. Without a lawfully-appointed Director, there are 
substantial doubts about CFPB’s ability to regulate nondepository 
providers of financial services and to exercise many of the other 
powers delegated to CFPB by Title X. 
The financial services industry and Republican leaders have 
justified their campaign against CFPB by claiming that the bureau 
has unprecedented powers as well as a unique structure that is 
unaccountable to the political branches. In fact, as shown above, 
CFPB’s structure and powers closely resemble those of other federal 
financial regulators, particularly FHFA and OCC. Major banks and 
their legislative supporters strongly supported the creation of FHFA 
in 2008 and emphasized FHFA’s need for sweeping powers and an 
independent funding source that would not be subject to 
congressional control. Similarly, large banks and Republican leaders 
have consistently and vigorously defended OCC’s authority and 
autonomy.  
Moreover, CFPB is hardly an unaccountable agency. CFPB 
must consult with a wide variety of outside parties before issuing 
regulations. Congress has extensive powers to oversee CFPB’s 
operations, and FSOC may review and set aside CFPB’s regulations. 
Accordingly, it seems clear that the financial services industry and its 
political allies oppose CFPB because of its statutory mission, not its 
structure.  
Large financial firms evidently fear that they cannot exercise 
the same degree of political influence over CFPB that they have 
successfully deployed in the past with regard to prudential regulators. 
In the financial industry’s view, CFPB is likely to act independently 
and conscientiously in carrying out its mandate to protect consumers 
from predatory financial practices. Congress should want that result. 
The financial crisis has shown convincingly that a systematic failure 
to protect consumers will eventually threaten the stability of our 
financial system as well as our general economy. Congress should 
therefore preserve CFPB’s existing authority and autonomy despite 
the determined attacks of the financial services industry and its 
Republican allies. 
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